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THE SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE STATUTE
OF 1988: AN UNCERTAIN PROGNOSIS
Cynthia A. Lewis*
INTRODUCTION
On January 5, 1988, the Soviet Union, in partial response to Presi-
dent Gorbachev's glasnost reforms, adopted the "Statute on Conditions
and Procedures for the Provision of Psychiatric Assistance" (Statute)."
The Statute is significant because it is the first comprehensive legisla-
tive act in the Soviet Union to regulate all aspects of psychiatric assis-
tance, to define obligations of mental health professionals, and to pro-
fess a concern for individual patient rights.2 The Statute identifies
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Washington College of Law. The American University.
1. Statute on Conditions and Procedures for the Provision of Psychiatric Assis-
tance, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR, No. 2 [2440], (Jan. 13, 1988) (effective Mar. 1, 1988).
Item 19, at 22-27 (USSR), reprinted in New Law Broadens Mental Patients' Rights,
15 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS 11 (1988) [hereinafter Psychiatric Assistance Stat-
ute] (discussing the new Statute and procedures for administering psychiatric assis-
tance made effective on March 1, 1988); Gustafason, Soviet Human Rights Under
Gorbachev: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 177 (1987).
Glasnost is a term indicating openness that translates into a more relaxed state policy
toward censorship, restrictions on demonstrations, and the treatment of prisoners. Id. at
177, 180. Gorbachev's glasnost policies include plans to change the Criminal Code to
allow individuals more freedom to appeal in court and extinguish the abuse of psychia-
try that leads to denial of an individual's access to the judicial system. Id.; Quigley,
Soviet Courts Undergoing Major Reforms, 22 INT'L LAW. 459, 460 (1988). Glasnost
means openness, relating to anticipated legal and political reform in the Soviet Union
under Gorbachev. Id.; see Statute Adopted Against Psychiatric Malpractices, FOR-
EIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE -SovIET UNION (F.B.I.S.-SOV), Jan. 6,
1988, at 40 [hereinafter Psychiatric Malpractices] (stating that the USSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium adopted a Statute concerning the procedures for administering psy-
chiatric assistance); Criminal, Civil Codes Under Consideration, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan.
28, 1988, at 53 (stating that the Director of the Soviet Institute of Law regards the
reform of the Soviet Criminal Code as part of overall Soviet governmental and legal
reforms designed to improve the protection of individuals civil rights); Jost, The ABA,
the Soviet Union and Advancing Human Rights, 120 N.J.L.J. 5, 23 (1987) (viewing
the Soviet appeals law as a valuable contribution to the policy of glasnost because it
gives the court more power to protect individual rights from the abuses of the Soviet
bureaucracy).
2. Explain Supreme Soviet Decree, F.B.I.S.--SOV, Feb. 18, 1988, at 80. The
Chief Psychiatrist of the Soviet Ministry of Public Health, Aleksandr Churkin, empha-
sized in an interview that this comprehensive legislation was the first of its type to
pertain to all aspects of psychiatric assistance, regulating both the procedure for treat-
ing the patient and the ethical responsibilities of health officials involved. Id. Churkin
also stated that this Statute was designed to respond to the concern for the humane
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specific procedures for administering psychiatric assistance and enu-
merates conditions under which a person can be hospitalized in a psy-
chiatric institution.3
The Statute lists three basic objectives at the outset. First, it defines
procedures and conditions for the administration of psychiatric assis-
tance. Second, it attempts to protect the rights of mentally ill people.0
Third, it seeks to protect society from mentally ill people who may pose
a physical danger.6 Under the Statute, an individual has the right to
refuse commitment to a state mental hospital unless diagnosed as men-
tally ill.7 The tenets of the Statute also address a person's right to ap-
peal such findings and his guaranteed right to humane and fair treat-
ment if a diagnosis of mental illness is substantiated.8 The Statute
treatment of psychiatric patients. Id.; Public 'Not Yet Ready' to Debate Psychiatry,
F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 23, 1988, at 60 [hereinafter Public 'Not Yet Ready' to Debate
Psychiatry]. The provisions of this Statute create comprehensive law that governs as-
pects of medical and social treatment of psychiatric patients, guaranteeing individual
rights by shifting the burden of protection to mental health officials and professionals.
Id. at 62; see Psychiatric Abuse in USSR, CANDLE AND CADUCEUS 3 (1988) (stating
that the psychiatric decree of the Presidium is the first statement of rights for mental
patients in 27 years and that a previous secret directive, under the supervision of the
Ministry of Health, governed psychiatric commitment).
3. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-14; see Psychiatric Malprac-
tices, supra note 1, at 40 (declaring that the Psychiatric Assistance Statute sets forth
administrative rules of procedure for rendering psychiatric assistance and highlighting
the responsibilities of health officials to comply with this Presidium statute); see also
Psychiatric "Errors, Malpractices" Redressed, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 6, 1988, at 27
[hereinafter Psychiatric "Errors, Malpractices" Redressed] (observing that the Stat-
ute includes provisions that stress the importance of preventing psychiatric
malpractice).
4. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-13.
5. id.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 11-12. The Statute indicates that a psychiatrist commits an individual to a
psychiatric institution with the person's consent. Id. Moreover, under the Statute, only
in special circumstances where the individual poses a threat to himself or individuals in
his vicinity may the psychiatrist legitimately force the person to be institutionalized. Id.
at 12. Furthermore, if institutionalized, the Statute requires that a panel of psychia-
trists subsequently examine the patient. Id. The Statute also grants the patient a right
of appeal and monthly psychiatric reevaluation with a goal of patient release as soon as
possible. Id.; see Psychiatrist Answers Questions on New Law, F.B.I.S.--SOV, Mar. I,
1988, at 50 [hereinafter Psychiatrist Answers Questions] (noting that Chief Psychia-
trist Churkin states that the new Statute makes it mandatory for Soviet officials and
psychiatric professionals to prioritize concern for the social well-being and legal rights
of mental patients).
8. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11. Those suffering from mental
disorders are guaranteed, in accordance with the general provisions of the new Statute,
legal and social assistance, the right to petition for a local psychiatrist to examine
them, and treatment through the least physically restrictive psychiatric methods possi-
ble. Id. A person subject to psychiatric examination or in disagreement with the psychi-
atric findings can appeal to the appropriate chief psychiatrist of the area's public health
establishment. Id. at 12. That chief psychiatrist may appoint a commission to examine
[VOL. 4:617
SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC STATUTE
indicates that, in certain situations, mental health professionals who
knowingly abuse their professional positions are subject to criminal lia-
bility." In addition, this Statute repeatedly acknowledges the impor-
tance of a patient's consent, proclaiming that only mentally ill people
presenting an immediate danger to society or themselves will be forci-
bly institutionalized.1" Finally, the Statute indicates that it will facili-
tate a reorganization of the administrative and professional hierarchy
controlling the committal of people to institutions and their subsequent
treatment.1 - Such reorganization will include: first, the appointment of
regional chief psychiatrists, second, the involvement of local govern-
ment, judicial, and health organizations in patient evaluation, and
third, the utilization of professional review boards to verify psychiatric
diagnoses.12
This Comment examines the provisions of the Statute that in theory
represent a concern for human rights and accurate psychiatric diagno-
sis and treatment not previously expressed in laws of the Soviet
the individual's mental health. Id. In addition, a commission of psychiatrists will review
the mental health of the patient every six months, and public health agencies may
check the legitimacy of the psychiatric commitment of any patient. Id. at 13. In in-
stances where a diagnosis indicates that a person must immediately be sent to a psychi-
atric hospital, that person should receive a monthly professional review. The New Leg-
islation Regarding Psychiatric Help, USSR News Briefs, Feb. 29, 1988, at 4; see
Psychiatrist Answers Questions, supra note 7, at 50 (explaining that when appealing a
psychiatrist's diagnosis, a patient has the right to request that a psychiatrist from the
person's region of habitation is appointed to the review board).
9. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note I, at I1. The Statute specifically
states in its general provisions that anyone who knowingly commits a psychologically
healthy person to a psychiatric hospital must face criminal liability and prosecution. Id.
Additionally, if malpractice occurs, the Statute gives the Soviet Prosecutor's Office
chief supervisory powers within specific jurisdictions to litigate. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 11-13. The Statute provides for compulsory psychiatric treatment for
people who demonstrate certain characteristics of mental illness and pose a criminal
danger to society. Id. at 12. Compulsory commitment may occur when patients present
an immediate danger to themselves or society. Id. The Statute stipulates that if a per-
son is found mentally ill and dangerous upon forced commitment to a psychiatric hospi-
tal, that person's relatives and lawyers must be immediately notified and a commission
of psychiatrists must check the validity of nonconsensual admission within a twenty-
four hour period. Id.
11. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 11-13. Allegedly, the Statute will involve both local health agencies and
psychiatrists in the psychiatric examination process. Id. at 11. The duties and responsi-
bilities of chief psychiatrists of public health agencies create a geographical hierarchy
that acts as a check on lower level professionals. Id. at 13; see Public 'Not Yet Ready'
to Debate Psychiatry, supra note 2, at 62 (noting that the Statute mandates the ap-
pointment of a chief psychiatrist for each geographical area to oversee treatment and
hospitalization practices iri order to prevent malpractice or diagnostic error); see also
Psychiatric Malpractices, supra note 1, at 40 (indicating that the Statute defines the
rights and duties of the chief psychiatrists, granting them power to review suspect non-
consensual psychiatric commitment).
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Union.13 On its face, the broad language of the Statute claims to re-
spect concepts of socialism, democratism, and humanism 14 which ap-
peal to values of righteousness and humanitarianism." Yet, upon ex-
amination of this Statute, in light of its historical background and the
present state of Soviet psychiatric treatment and commitment, it is ap-
parent that the Soviet government will face inherent difficulties in im-
plementing the Statute's expressed ideology. Part II explores the histor-
ical background of the Statute and the Marxist-Leninist tradition in
the realm of human rights. In addition, Part II examines the Soviet
Union's conformance to international human rights agreements and ad-
dresses the Soviet government's failure to enact promises associated
with the Helsinki Final Act."6 Part III analyzes the legal guidelines
prior to the enactment of the Statute, 17 modifications present in the
13. See Public 'Not Yet Ready' to Debate Psychiatry, supra note 2, at 63 (explain-
ing that, for the first time, an integrated law now exists governing provision of medical
and social assistance to people suffering from mental illness).
14. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11. The Statute specifically
provides psychiatric assistance for those people who are mentally ill "on the basis of the
principles of democratism, socialist legality, humanism and mercy." Id.
15. Accord Bozeman, Human Rights and National Security, 9 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 40, 58 (1982) (explaining that the 1977 Constitution expresses some classi-
cally western freedoms).
16. Conference on Security and Coop. in Eur., Final Act, Helsinki, (1975), United
States Dep't of State, Foreign Policy Series No. 8826 [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act];
Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union: The Policy of Dissimulation, 29
DEPAUL L. REV. 819, 863 (1980) [hereinafter Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet
Union]. The Soviet Union did not uphold the promises made to protect civil and politi-
cal rights at the Helsinki Conference that produced the Helsinki Final Act. Id. The
failure of the Soviet Union to follow the humanitarian obligations stated in the United
Nations Charter and United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights violates
the human rights of Soviet dissidents. Id.; see Comment, The Fine Line Between the
Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements and the Violation of National Sovereignty:
The Case of the Soviet Dissidents, 7 Loy. L.A. INT'L & ComP. L.J. 323, 329-31
(1984) [hereinafter Comment, Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements] (explain-
ing that although the Helsinki Final Act is not a legally binding document, it refers to
human rights concerns that coincide with the nature of other binding United Nations
human rights agreements, including the International Covenant on Human Rights); see
also Osakwe, Soviet Human Rights Law Under the USSR Constitution of 1977: Theo-
ries, Realities and Trends, 56 TUL. L. REv. 249, 287 (1981) (discussing Soviet human
rights violations against dissidents and psychiatric patients).
17. See Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, Amnesty International Brief-
ing, EUR. 46/1/83, Mar. 1983, at 1-21 [hereinafter Amnesty International, Political
Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR] (explaining that the vagueness and broadness in the
civil commitment procedure stated in the 1971 Directive on Emergency Confinement of
Mentally Ill Persons Who Represent a Social Danger led to arbitrary nonconsensual
confinement of people in mental institutions). Doctors who order a person committed to
a mental institution or hospital send a report to the hospital; thereafter, a commission
of three psychiatrists must determine whether the confinement should continue. Id. at
4. Once discharged, the person is placed on a special list and monitored. Id. Because
descriptions of symptoms of mental illness were imprecise, violations of the 1971 Direc-
tive regulations occurred frequently. Id. at 3; How Psychiatry is Abused in the USSR,
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new Statute,18 and the significance of the established practice of using
the psychiatric profession to control dissent.19 Part IV analyzes the do-
mestic origins of support for implementation of the Statute, as ad-
vanced by administrative leadership changes,20 the appeals law, 21 and
39 CURRENT DIG. SovIET PRESS, 1, 1-3 (1987) [hereinafter How Psychiatry is Abused
in the USSR] (illustrating that psychiatrists, as well as other public officials, violated
the psychiatric 1971 Directive and other instructions that regulated easy and frequent
commitment). It is possible for psychiatrists to hospitalize patients without approval
from the chief psychiatrist or without notice to the patient, relatives, or lawyers. Id.
18. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 13. The new Statute on Psychi-
atric Assistance was designed to: (1) create a more organized and uniform law; (2)
make psychiatric assistance primarily voluntary with forced treatment as an exception
to prevailing practice of consensual treatment; (3) subject all mental health cases only
to the supervision of the Ministry of Health; (4) allow patients to appeal diagnoses; and
make defense lawyers mandatorily available for patients. Id. at 13-14; Psychiatric "Er-
rors, Malpractices" Redressed, supra note 3, at 27. The new Statute amends the
Criminal Code to make mental health professionals liable for illegally committing peo-
ple to mental hospitals if they are known to be healthy. Id. at 27; see Van der Stoel,
Human Rights in the Soviet Union, 6 NETH. Q. Hu~t. RTs. 1, 75-76 (1988) (reporting
that since passage of the psychiatric law, Soviet mental health officials deny that there
are abuses of psychiatric diagnoses of patients); Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, Sci-
ENcE, Feb. 5, 1988, at 551 [hereinafter Politics and Soviet Society] (noting that, al-
though the new psychiatric legislation can not yet be accurately analyzed as to its
effects, 100 dissidents were released; Helsinki Watch estimates that 200-1000 political
dissidents are still confined in psychiatric hospitals).
19. Van der Stoel, supra note 18, at 75. People who publicize views or behave in a
manner that the Soviet government considers politically bothersome face commitment
to mental hospitals even though no evidence indicates that they are mentally ill. Id.; see
Osakwe, supra note 16, at 284 (claiming that dissidents have no legal rights due to the
Soviet government effort to suppress dissenting opinions); Comment, Human Rights in
the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 854-55 (defining Soviet dissent as a term that
applies to any individual who the Soviet government considers "actively resistant to the
security and implementation of the Communist party's policies"); Comment, Soviet
Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment: An International Human Rights Issue, 9 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 629, 629-30 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric
Commitment] (suggesting that the Soviet government represses the opinions and ac-
tions of individuals who speak or act against the government's practices and laws, and
punishes them using coercive hospitalization).
20. See Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551 (arguing that the
effects of the Statute will escape realization if the leadership of the psychiatric admin-
istration is not changed).
21. LAW OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON PROCEDURES FOR
APPEALING TO THE COURT UNLAWFUL ACTIONS BY OFFICIALS THAT INFRINGE THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, trans. in Law on Appealing Officials' Illegal Actions, 29 CUR-
RENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS 12, 12-13 (1987) [hereinafter Law on Appealing Officials
Illegal Actions]; see Quigley, The New Soviet Law on Appeals: "Glasnost" in the So-
viet Courts, 37 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 172 (1988) [hereinafter Quigley, New Soviet
Law] (describing the appeals law that permits individuals to appeal to courts if they
feel that the administrative actions of a government official have in some way violated
their rights). The report indicates that the appeals law impacts employment and hous-
ing, requiring fair dismissals and fair review of housing applications. Id. at 173. How-
ever, Soviet citizens may not appeal decisions or actions of a government board. Id. at
176.
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the Criminal Code amendments.2" Finally, Part V considers the signifi-
cance of international pressure on the Soviet government to implement
the Statute and reform Soviet psychiatric practices.23 Part VI of the
Comment recommends practical ways to increase protection for indi-
vidual rights and facilitate effective implementation of the Statute. The
Comment concludes with a sober appraisal of the potential long-term
effectiveness of the Statute.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The significance of individual freedom, expressed in the Statute and
its application to Soviet society, merits an examination of the Soviet
Union's historical treatment of human rights issues. The government of
the Soviet Union originally based its communist theories on a Marxist-
Leninist philosophy. 24 The Marxist-Leninist theory is a source of the
22. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 4 (explaining that prior to the Statute, a person convicted under the Crimi-
nal Code had no procedural right to a defense and an appeal); The New Legislation
Regarding Psychiatric Help, supra note 8, at 4 (reporting that while creating the Stat-
ute, legislators also drafted an amendment to the Criminal Code that makes it a crime
to knowingly commit a mentally healthy person to a psychiatric hospital).
23. Ellman, Psychiatric Treatment for Political Dissidents in the USSR, 7 POLY.
L. REV. 82, 85 (1982) (explaining that pressure from international organizations such
as the WPA in the 1970s helped influence the Soviet government to reform its abusive
practices); see Osakwe, supra note 16, at 250 (demonstrating that human rights laws
in the Soviet Union did not start developing until the 1970s and that this legislation's
goal was to create the appearance that Soviet laws complied with international human
rights legal protections); Sharansky, Gorbachev Plays a Double Game, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 4, 1988, at 4 (reporting that in order to secure western approval and cooperation
to exchange scientific knowledge, the Soviet Union at times fabricates Soviet human
rights concessions). Reporters warn that the Soviet government will make the fewest
concessions necessary to appease western human rights activists, and that although the
Soviet government will improve human rights in some areas, it will tighten control in
other areas. Id.; see also Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551 (report-
ing that the Soviet Union wants to regain membership in the WPA, therefore, it is
susceptible to pressure from western countries and organizations).
24. See Bozeman, supra note 15, at 57 (explaining that the Marxist-Leninist doc-
trine in the Soviet Union describes that material circumstances in the world and the
on-going class struggle control human destiny). The Soviet interpretation of this doc-
trine describes individual rights as "bourgeois illusions and entrapments." Id.; Dean,
Beyond Helsinki: The Soviet View of Human Rights in International Law, 21 VA. J.
INT'L. L. 55, 57 (1980) (stating that Soviet theorists contend that individuals only have
rights specifically conferred on citizens through Soviet law, which is rooted in Marxist-
Leninist theory); loffe, Soviet Attitudes Toward International Human Rights Law, 2
CONN. J. INT'L L. 361 (1987) (defining Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union as a
stage of society when the need for communism, laws, and protection of human rights
will naturally wither away). The Soviet government functions under the theory that
human rights will only be a guaranteed protection when it is in the Soviet State's best
interest. Id.; Osakwe, supra note 16, at 249, 255-56 (describing Marxist-Leninist ideol-
ogy as a theory that does not recognize individual rights and freedoms).
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Soviet government's traditional reluctance to legislate human rights
laws, such as the Statute, because of its belief that individual rights do
not need statutory protection. 25 According to this theory, an ideal so-
cialist society does not need human rights laws 26 because elementary
individual rights already exist as a product of the economic develop-
ment of society.27 Human rights are a product of economic determin-
ism, controlled by the naturally dominant class in society.28 Thus, uni-
versal human rights do not exist unless they develop as the by-products
of a functioning socialist state.2
A. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN SOVIET LAW
The Marxist-Leninist theory evolved in Soviet society as a theory of
communism, stressing the superiority of collective will over individual
rights.30 The Soviet socialist doctrine supports individual rights only if
25. See Ioffe, supra note 24, at 361 (theorizing that pure socialism eradicates the
need for human rights legislation); Osakwe, supra note 16, at 255 (explaining the
Marxist-Leninist theory supports individual human rights because they evolve from the
societal structure of the state).
26. See Ioffe, supra note 24, at 361 (stating that an underlying philosophy of
Marxist-Leninist socialism is the need for the protection of human rights becomes un-
necessary if society attains a natural balance).
27. See Bozeman, supra note 15, at 57 (explaining that individual human rights in
Soviet society are not central to the dynamic of economic determinism; therefore, inter-
nationally recognized human rights have no legal relevance). Human destiny is a prod-
uct of the economic conditions of the state; thus, human rights legislation will face
enforcement and state support only if necessary to further economic goals. Id.; Dean,
supra note 24, at 57 (arguing that human rights have no recognized legitimacy unless
specific state legislation creates them); Ioffe, supra note 24, at 361 (explaining that the
Marxist-Leninist tradition holds that human rights are products of the state's develop-
ment). This philosophy encourages the belief that in the perfect socialist society the
need for any human rights legislation will disappear, as laws "wither away." Id.
28. DEPT. OF STATE, 100TH CONG. 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987 1045, 1063 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987] (stating that the Com-
munist Party controls political, social, and economic functions at every level of govern-
ment); Dean, supra note 24, at 66-67 (recognizing that the Soviet government plays a
major role in shaping the directions of Soviet society because of the existence of party
control over economic determinism); see also Osakve, supra note 16, at 264 (describ-
ing the Soviet government's absolute right to recognize and to enforce or to ignore
individual rights because of the nature of Soviet law that places societal interests far
beyond those of the individual).
29. See Dean, supra note 24, at 57, 60-61 (examining the Soviet theory that indi-
vidual rights are a function of economic rights as the state determines). The Soviet
State controls rights granted to its citizens. Id.; Marks, Engineering Human Rights: A
New Generation for the 1980s, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 436-38 (1981) (explaining
the concept that individual rights do not exist unless enacted through specific laws).
30. Osakwe, supra note 16, at 261-62. The collective will of the group dominates
the rights of the individual in Soviet society. Id. The Marxist-Leninist theory views
individual rights as products of the socio-economic structure of society. Id.; see Dean,
supra note 24, at 61-62 (emphasizing that only through the recognition of economic
1989]
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the state chooses to recognize or create them under the Soviet doctrine
of positive law.3' In the Soviet Communist government, actual power is
hierarchical and theories do not become law unless the party apparatus
legislates them. 2
As a result, the evolution of Marxist-Leninist socialism into Soviet
communism mandates that individuals subject to psychiatric treatment
cannot claim violation of their human rights unless they document the
existence of a statute or directive recognizing these rights. In light of
this philosophical history, the Statute is not legislation ratified to pro-
tect an abstract concept of universal human rights,33 rather it repre-
sents newly created individual rights.34
B. IDEALS EXPRESSED IN THE 1977 CONSTITUTION
The 1977 Constitution is an example of how ideological representa-
tions do not have legal application to Soviet society unless enacted in
specific legislation. The 1977 Constitution35 enumerates human rights
not specified in previous Soviet constitutions.3" This inclusion can be
and social rights, such as the right to work and to an adequate education, can a person
attain individual rights); see also Osakwe, supra note 16, at 248-50 (arguing that
statements in the 1977 Constitution supporting human rights are not a product of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, because efforts to protect individual rights are a recent phe-
nomenon). See generally R. MEDVEDEV, ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY, (1975) (discuss-
ing socialism and democracy, and their historical roots in the Soviet Union).
31. Osakwe, supra note 16, at 254. According to Soviet philosophy, the concept of
positive law is essentially synonymous to Soviet law and the 1977 Constitution because
Soviet law does not recognize natural law as a source of Soviet law and does not profess
a belief in the "inalienable rights of man." Id. Instead, rights exist as a result of gov-
ernmental mandates and legislation. Id. All rights in the Soviet Union exist only if the
ideology is present in the constitution and the state legislates to protect such rights. Id.;
see Comment, Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements, supra note 16, at 335-36(setting forth the traditional western concept of human rights as a theory which recog-
nizes that people possess universal inalienable human rights that they expect the gov-
ernmental body to protect through legislation). These human rights exist under this
theory even if a state fails to enact legislation to protect them. Id. at 335.
32. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note 28,
at 1063. In the Soviet government, actual power exists at the top of the political hierar-
chy and implementation of decisions is left to a small group of subordinate officials. Id.;
see Dean, supra note 24, at 61, 64-65 (explaining that in Soviet society the government
is the source of human rights, and, therefore, has the responsibility of creating and
guarding against abuses).
33. See Osakwe, supra note 16, at 254 (recognizing that Soviet legal norms do not
support the existence of "inalienable rights"). Western society defines inalienable rights
as a sphere of legal rights inherent upon a person's birth. Id.
34. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-14.
35. KONST. SSSR, art. 39 (1977), trans. in Hecht, THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH
ITS LAWS 19-60 (1983) (1977 Constitution).
36. See Chalidze, The Humanitarian Provisions of the Helsinki Accord: A Cri-
tique of Their Significance, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 463 (1980) (insisting
that the 1936 Constitution recognized only one-half of the human rights guaranteed in
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attributed to internal and international pressure to protect human
rights.3
7
According to the Soviet socialist governmental tradition, however,
the 1977 Constitution is merely a document that sets forth the ideologi-
cal framework of societal values and legal norms. 38 Under socialism,
the constitution is a declaration of a new phase of legal and socio-politi-
cal development.39 It merely heralds principles for government authori-
ties to follow.40 Therefore, as interpreted, the 1977 Constitution does
not provide for specific legal remedies41 and is not a document for indi-
viduals to rely on for protection of their human rights.
Prior to the enactment of this comprehensive Statute, freedoms stip-
the 1977 Constitution).
37. Id. at 463. The increased recognition of specifically enumerated human rights
in the 1977 Constitution resulted from internal dissent that encouraged international
organizations to call for Soviet reform. Id. at 452, 463; see loffe, supra note 24, at 362
(explaining that the Soviet government's promises, internationally in accordance with
the intent of the Helsinki Final Act to improve human rights guarantees, are in part
recognized in the enactment of the 1977 Constitution).
38. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrICES FOR 1987, supra note 28, at
1063. The 1977 Constitution provides Soviet society with a guiding framework on
which to base the development of its political system. Id.; see Bozeman, supra note 15,
at 58. The 1977 Constitution expresses freedoms characteristic of Western countries,
yet also indicates that these stated liberties can only be legally applied to Soviet society
to strengthen the interests of the state. Id.; Dean, supra note 24, at 65. Article 39 of
the 1977 Constitution limits the rights guaranteed to individuals and states that indi-
vidual rights can not be upheld when they have a negative impact on the Soviet State.
Id.; Feldbrugge, The Soviet Human Rights Doctrine in the Crossfire Between Dissi-
dents at Home and Critics Abroad, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 451, 462 (1980)
(stating that, in forming the 1977 Constitution, the Soviet government considered the
threat of internal dissent and, thus, made individual freedoms subsidiary to the overall
interests of the state government). The 1977 Constitution, partially in response to the
1970s dissent movement in the Soviet Union, represents a strategic design for the So-
viet human rights doctrine and defines basic duties of both the citizens and govern-
ment. Id.
39. Scurlock, Constitutionalism Soviet Style, 48 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 167, 168
(1980).
40. Id. The 1977 Constitution provides political and theoretical guidelines to govern
developing Soviet society. Id. at 168; see Feldbrugge, supra note 38, at 463 (explaining
that the 1977 Constitution merely indicates the Soviet government's ideal goals that
are not realized unless legislation supports them). Citizens may only enjoy rights that
state laws specifically mandate. Dean, supra note 24, at 57-59. Compare offe, supra
note 24, at 363 (describing that even though rights are enumerated in the 1977 Consti-
tution, they have no weight because an individual can not base a claim for legal re-
course on the constitution) with Osakwe, supra note 16, at 249-50 (arguing that the
human rights guarantees of the 1977 Constitution demonstrate that the Soviet govern-
ment has both the goal and intention to create laws supporting human rights and the
government, as well as honoring such proclamations through the creation of laws).
41. Feldbrugge, supra note 38, at 463. The reality of Soviet constitutional law is
that it is not utilized in the Soviet legal system to protect individual human rights. Id.
The 1977 Constitution is not used to appeal Soviet State practices. Id. at 465-66.
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ulated in the constitution were merely a facade.42 People subject to psy-
chiatric examination and confinement had few individual rights.43 Sup-
pression of individual rights continued after the enactment of the 1977
Constitution because rights recognized in the constitution are not le-
gally applicable to individuals in Soviet society." Therefore, subjects of
psychiatric treatment will not be accorded legally recognized rights un-
til specific laws pertaining to psychiatric assistance are adopted.
The 1977 Constitution represents the ideological goals of the state
that often support the interests of the state at the expense of individual
rights. 45 The language of the constitution indicates that an objective of
the Soviet government should be to strengthen and aid the development
of the traditional socialist state, valuing collectivity over individuality.4
For example, the claims supporting freedom of speech do not identify
an individual's right to publicly dissent to Communist party
principles.47
As long as the Statute does not support individual rights at the ex-
pense of governmentally defined societal interests, it can be interpreted
as being consistent with the 1977 Constitution. 48 The values and goals
expressed in the 1977 Constitution may forecast a conservative inter-
pretation of the language of the Statute. Therefore, due to the con-
servative nature of the 1977 Constitution, and despite the new Statute,
individual rights may receive limited protection when they conflict with
Communist party goals.
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that rights do not exist
unless the state specifically legislates them).
43. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 3 (asserting that legal rights for individuals confined in psychiatric hospitals
are vague and easily manipulated).
44. See Ioffe, supra note 24, at 363-64 (claiming that human rights declarations in
the 1977 Constitution will provide no effective legal recourse if legislation is not en-
acted at the national and local level providing for specific legal rights and remedies).
45. Feldbrugge, supra note 38, at 462. The general provisions of the 1977 Constitu-
tion contain language that pertains to human rights. Id. The 1977 Constitution specifi-
cally states that "[iun exercising their rights and freedoms, citizens may not injure the
interests of society and the state or the rights of other citizens." Id.; KONST. SSSR art.
39 (1977), trans. in HECHT, THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITS LAWS 19-60 (1983).
The 1977 Constitution further stresses the superior interests of the Soviet state to in-
crease its power over the rights of the individual. Id. art. 59, para. 2, art. 62, art. 65
(1977).
46. Feldbrugge, supra note 38, at 463. Constitutional freedoms do not support indi-
vidual dissent and criticism of the Soviet party government if such dissent conflicts
with or harms the collective goals of the Soviet State. Id.; KONST. SSSR art. 39
(1977), trans. in Hecht, THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITS LAWS 19-60 (1983).




C. SOVIET RESISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE REGARDING
HUMAN RIGHTS
The Soviet government generally resists international pressures to re-
form internal state legislation.49 The Soviet Union is a strong proponent
of the sanctity of sovereign rule when confronted with international in-
terference. 50 Self-determination concerning legal, social, and political
49. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-14; Abuse of Psychiatry in
the Soviet Union, 1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Intl.
Organizations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Comm. on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe House of Rep., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hear-
ing] (discussing the concern of the United States over the political use of psychiatry in
the Soviet Union). In addition, legislators interviewed several human rights activists,
psychiatric professionals, and dissidents on the state of psychiatric law and abuse in the
Soviet Union. Id.; Ellman, supra note 23, at 85 (concluding that accounts of Soviet
psychiatric abuse of patient's rights and indiscriminate treatment with harmful drugs,
concerned the World Psychiatric Association (WPA)). In the late 1970s, the WPA
tried to convince the Soviets to halt abusive practices and considered the expulsion of
the Soviet Union from the WPA. Id. at 85; Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet
Union, supra note 16, at 823. In the Soviet Union, national sovereignty is of primary
importance and takes precedence over general principles of international law. Id.; see
Osakwe, supra note 16, at 287 (indicating that concern over whether the Soviets would
keep promises made under the Helsinki Final Act led to the creation of Helsinki Watch
groups that track abuses of the rights of dissidents in psychiatric prisons); Comment,
Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 629 (explaining that psy-
chiatric law and treatment developed into an issue of international concern when the
Soviet government increasingly used psychiatric hospitalization to control dissent); Am-
nesty International Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 1-21
(outlining the Amnesty International extensive record of abusive psychiatric treatment
of dissidents at the discretion of the Soviet Psychiatric professionals and government
officials). Amnesty International closely monitors abuses and frequently sends letters to
the Soviet Union appealing for the release of healthy dissidents. Id.; see also Politics
and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551 (setting forth the Helsinki Watch moni-
toring of Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and describing the number of
people hospitalized for political dissent); Koryagin, World Psychiatry" Readmitting the
Soviet Union, LANCET, July 30, 1988, at 268 (noting what considerations the WPA
must examine before allowing the Soviet Union to rejoin the organization after its res-
ignation); Superpowers Seek Accord On Visiting Mental Hospitals, N.Y. Times, May
22, 1988, at 1 (reporting on preliminary arrangements to allow American psychiatrists
to visit Soviet mental hospitals - a goal that the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) has repeatedly sought); INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE POUTICAL USE
OF PSYCHIATRY (IAPUP), Informational Bulletin No. 18, Apr. 1988, at 1-8 [hereinaf-
ter IAPUP Information Bulletin No. 18] (outlining psychiatric abuse in the Soviet
Union). The IAPUP is an organization of national groups that focus on the freedom of
political prisoners subject to the political use of psychiatry. Id.
50. Id. The Soviet government claims that the United Nations Charter supports the
superior role of national sovereignty, indicating that issues of national sovereignty pre-
clude international interference. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(7); Comment, Human Rights
in the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 823; see Comment, Enforcement of Human
Rights Agreements, supra note 16, at 338-39 (asserting that Soviet officials continue to
support the dominance of sovereignty over international law because such views do not
represent Soviet State interests and support capitalist over socialist concerns). In addi-
tion, Soviet government officials believe that the notion of sovereignty is superior to
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issues is a primary concern of the Soviet State, and rules of interna-
tional law are considered binding only if they coincide with principles
of Soviet law.51 Consequently, Soviet government policy resists interna-
tional pressure regarding Soviet human rights issues. The Soviet gov-
ernment asserts that the mere predominance of western views on
human rights in international law does not destroy the validity of So-
viet views.51 As a result of the Soviet historical emphasis on the value
of self determinism,53 the Soviet government may resist international
efforts to encourage administrative compliance with the Statute.5 4
Soviet resistance to international pressure to conform to human
rights agreements is evident in the Helsinki Final Act.55 Although the
Helsinki Final Act is an international declaration that is not legally
binding under international law, it implies a moral commitment to ad-
here to humanitarian principles .5 Due to failure of the Soviet Union to
adhere to the principles of this declaration, Helsinki Watch groups
monitor Soviet compliance.57 In an attempt to diffuse international
international law because historically significant socialist value of state self-determina-
tion repudiates foreign interference in Soviet State matters. Id. at 339.
51. Osakwe, supra note 16, at 266. The Soviet conflict of laws regulations stipulate
that when Soviet domestic law conflicts with an international agreement to which the
Soviet Union is a party, the agreement will not be considered valid. Id. The Soviets
may apply International treaties or agreements to Soviet law with reservations. Id.
52. Comment, Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements, supra note 16, at 338-
39. The Soviet Union expresses concern over the predominance of western capitalist
views in areas of international law and refuses to allow international law to dominate
over socialist sovereign state policies and laws. Id.
53. Id. at 339. The Soviet government officials' perceived right to sovereignty and
freedom from international interference is an expression of the value of self determina-
tion. Id.
54. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note
28, at 1064 (reporting that the Soviet government resists international pressures for
reform, claiming that human rights issues involve internal political problems soley of
Soviet national concern).
55. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 16, at 425; see Comment, Enforcement of
Human Rights Agreements, supra note 16, at 325 (explaining that the Helsinki Final
Act is merely a declaration and, therefore, not legally binding).
56. Comment, Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements, supra note 16, at 323-
25 (stating that the Helsinki Final Act is a declaration of co-operation concerning
human rights practices not legally binding upon the Soviet Union). Principles of the
United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights legally guaranteeing basic
human rights imply an obligation for the Soviet Union to comply with the principles of
human rights expressed in the Helsinki Final Act. Id. at 329. Compare Comment,
Human Rights in the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 830-31 (explaining that the Hel-
sinki Final Act is neither a legally binding treaty nor a convention, thus the Soviet
Union is not legally obligated to comply with it). The Helsinki Final Act, however,
creates moral obligations. Id. with Chalidze, supra note 36, at 434 (claiming that the
Helsinki Final Act can not bind the Soviet Union because its language is too general).
57. Ellman, supra note 23, at 85 (explaining that the WPA showed concern for
Soviet abuses of psychiatric practices and asserted international pressures to change
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pressure for Soviet legal reform, the Soviet Union imprisoned and pun-
ished members of the Helsinki Watch groups; however, the opposite
effect occured as international concern intensified. 8 Yet, the Soviet
Union may attempt to diffuse international influence by enforcing the
new Statute in ways that further Soviet government goals.
D. PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT PRACTICES PRIOR
TO THE PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE STATUTE
A person diagnosed as mentally ill may be committed to one of two
psychiatric hospital systems. "Special" hospitals or "ordinary" hospi-
tals, under the control of the Ministry of Interior prior to 1988, are
intended for the criminally insane; however, Soviet government authori-
ties often use them to confine political dissidents. 9 Second, ordinary
hospitals confine patients considered less dangerous.60 A person may be
Soviet practices); Osakwe, supra note 16, at 287. In 1976, Helsinki Watch groups were
formed to monitor the Soviet compliance to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, due to the
Soviet government's demonstration of an increased harshness in the treatment of dissi-
dents. Id.; see Sharansky, supra note 23, at 4 (documenting the increased harshness in
treatment of dissidents, including violations of basic human rights occurring after the
Soviet government agreed to the Helsinki Accords); see also Amnesty International,
Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 20 (showing that concern
over human rights practices in the Soviet Union and the psychiatric abuse of political
dissidents led the WPA to increase its monitoring activities of Soviet practices and to
demand changes).
58. Osakwe, supra note 16, at 286-87. After Helsinki Watch groups were formed,
Soviet authorities imprisoned many members in a surge to repress the activity of such
groups. Id.; Testimony of Dr. Anatoly Koryagin at a Public Hearing of the Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 15, 1987, at 2-3 (asserting that
Soviet citizens who tried to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Accords were
seen as a threat and imprisoned, mainly because Soviet government officials realized
that their policies were not conforming to the Helsinki humanitarian terms and feared
the increased international publicity); see 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 16-17
(statement of Harold Vistosky, M.D., Chairman, Committee on International Abuse of
Psychiatry, American Psychiatric Association) (explaining that critics of the Soviet
psychiatric practices have been repressed and imprisoned because of their efforts to
publicize and reform practices); see also Comment, Enforcement of Human Rights
Agreements, supra note 16, at 333 (claiming that people in the Soviet Union are fre-
quently arrested and subjected to abuse in violation of the United Nations Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights); Universal Declaration and the Political Covenant, G.A.
Res. 2200 (XI), art. 27, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
59. 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 64-65 (Statement of Professor Harvey Fire-
side) (noting the commitment of dissidents to "special psychiatric hospitals" is used to
confine the criminally insane, that the Ministry of the Interior controls).
60. Id. All hospitals that are not "special psychiatric hospitals" are considered "or-
dinary" hospitals that health authorities control. Id.; see Comment, Soviet Abuse of
Psychiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 639 (indicating a broad criteria for com-
mitment that falls under the Civil Procedure Code). THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
OF THE RSFSR (amended 1964), THE SovIFr CODES OF LAw 544-680 (H. Berman &
J. Spindler trans. W. Simons ed. 1984) [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE).
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committed to a psychiatric hospital based on reported observations of
virtually any behavior considered incorrect or inappropriate in Soviet
society.61 When diagnosed as mentally ill during the pretrial period, the
person is immediately admitted to a hospital and his or her legal case is
terminated. 2
Treatment in the psychiatric hospital includes the forced administra-
tion of mind altering drugs; released dissidents have claimed that this is
often used as a method of punishment and control rather than ther-
apy.63 Prior to 1988, committed patients lost all civil rights;64 upon re-
lease, they faced the stigma of being labelled mentally ill, leading to
arbitrary recommitment and social and political restrictions.6 The
chief psychiatrist of the Ministry of Health, when asked to comment on
the state of psychiatric law and treatment prior to 1988, indicated that
patient's rights were often violated. 6  He claimed that this was due to
inexperienced psychiatrists and administrators whose attempts to pro-
tect both the patient and Soviet socialist values led to unintentional
abuses of patient's rights.67
61. Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 639.
The civil commitment procedure permits legal commitment for any behavior deemed
incorrect. Id.; see Ellman, supra note 23, at 84 (reporting that a mere complaint can
justify a government to authorize police to commit a person to a mental hospital); How
Psychiatry is Abused in the USSR, supra note 17, at 1-3 (identifying the forced com-
mitment of Anna Ivanovna). The Ministry forcibly committed Ivanova to a mental
hospital after she made repeated complaints to the Ministry of Interior about her both-
ersome neighbor. Id. at 2. Another Soviet citizen, Zoya Petrovna, accused her physi-
cians of negligence; the Ministry of Interior labelled her vocal complaints "litigious
activity" and put her name on the psychiatric register. Id. at 1.
62. Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 639.
63. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 66 (statement of Professor Harvey Fire-
side) (stating that drugs are administered to some patients solely as a form of punish-
ment and not as part of treatment). In addition, Dr. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. reported
that patients are subject to insulin shock therapy and sulfazin; neither drug is effective
in treating the mentally ill. Id. at 10; Comment, Enforcement of Human Rights Agree-
ments, supra note 16, at 334 (explaining that within institutions and hospitals, tortuous
drug treatments and beatings keep patients submissive).
64. See How Psychiatry Is Abused in the USSR, supra note 17, at 1-3 (asserting
that civil rights are easily and often violated); Grigoriants, Soviet Psychiatric Prison-
ers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1988, at A31 (describing the case of Vozgen Ayrapetyan
who was tricked into going to a psychiatric clinic because of his reputation as a com-
plainer); Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 12-16 (citing numerous cases of dissidents forcibly confined to psychiatric
hospitals because they registered criticisms or complaints concerning mundane aspects
of Soviet lifestyle).
65. Comment, Enforcement of Human Rights Agreements, supra note 16, at 335.
If a person publicly complains, that person is easily reconfined. Id.; see How Psychiatry
is Abused in the USSR, supra note 17, at I (reporting that Zoya Petrovna was forcibly
confined in a psychiatric clinic and later discriminated against because of her com-
plaints about medical treatment).




Prior to the 1988 Statute, the legal guarantees provided to people
subject to psychiatric analysis and confinement were more limited in
scope and ambiguous in content.6 8 The administration of psychiatric
law provoked fear in the Soviet people, through a belief that persons
who seemed slightly abnormal could be forcibly commited to a psychi-
atric hospital without notice or a chance to challenge the diagnosis."
Local hospitals, psychiatrists, and Party administrators implemented
psychiatric treatment based on separate admission and treatment pro-
cedures and a secret directive on emergency confinement.70 Vague
guidelines made the enforcement of procedures inconsistent and confus-
ing.7 1 The Soviet government provided two separate systems, civil and
68. Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note
17, at 3. The legal guidelines for psychiatric treatment and administration are vague,
and the language is easy to manipulate. Id. Compare Ellman, supra note 23, at 82
(explaining that the terminology of psychiatric rules and regulations fail to clearly de-
fine mental illness, and, thus, often facilitate compulsory commitment to a psychiatric
hospital) with Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 823-25
(asserting that the confusion over Soviet laws gives government authorities discretion-
ary power to interpret the laws as they wish).
69. How Psychiatry is Abused in the USSR, supra note 17, at 1-3. Psychiatrists
were able to ignore regulations on commitment and treatment of psychiatric patients
when they committed people to psychiatric institutions without first conducting an ini-
tial examination or giving notice to the patient. Id.; see No Political Prisoners Remain
in Asylums, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 7, 1988, at 46 (reporting that Soviet authorities ad-
mit that past practices facilitated the commitment of people with minor disorders with-
out affording them prior notice of the authorities' actions); Comment, Human Rights
in the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 862-63 (noting that committing patients to
mental hospitals occurs without granting the patient a right to challenge official
decisions).
70. See Ellman, supra note 23, at 82-83 (describing the secret 1971 Directive on
"emergency confinement of mentally ill persons who represent a social danger" that
defines the right to carry out compulsory psychiatric confinement); Maksimova, Offi-
cials Say Mental Patients' New Rights Will Deter Abuses: 'Immediate Danger' is Cri-
terion for Involuntary Commitment; Experiment in Some Areas Will Remove Many
Patients From Registers, 15 CURRENT DIG. SovIET PRESS 13 (1988) (stating in an
interview with a Soviet Psychiatric official, that prior to 1988, departmental regulations
governed the commitment and treatment of psychiatric patients); Amnesty Interna-
tional, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 4 (defining the
duty of the Procuracy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Commission of State Sec-
retary to investigate individual cases and determine who should be subjected to psychi-
atric examination).
71. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 7-9 (statement of Dr. Charles Fairbanks,
Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs)
(stating that broad prerequisite conditions for hospitalization give Soviet administrators
enormous discretion); Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (explaining
that the imprecise clinical definition of schizophrenia includes in its definition dissent as
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criminal, under which a person could be subjected to psychiatric treat-
ment and confinement. Under either system, socially unacceptable be-
havior justified forcible commitment; 2 this type of commitment oc-
curred without the consent of the patient or any right to legal counsel
for the patient. 3 Because psychiatrists, government administrators, or
police do not require professional accountability, these guidelines for
treatment and confinement are ineffective.
A. THE 1971 DIRECTIVE
The Ministry of Health, Ministry of Interior, and Procurator Gen-
eral ratified "The Secret Directive on Emergency Confinement of Per-
sons Who Represent a Social Danger" (1971 Directive).74 The 1971
Directive provides guidelines to regulate the forcible confinement of in-
dividuals to psychiatric hospitals.75 These guidelines justify random for-
cible confinement under a guise of protecting society from dangerous
people.76 In addition, the 1971 Directive indicates that government offi-
cials can forcibly confine mentally ill people to psychiatric hospitals
without their consent if their behavior suggests that they may "obvi-
ously" endanger themselves or others.77 The intentionally vague lan-
a symptom of mental illness).
72. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 64 (statement of Professor Harvey Fire-
side) (stating that under the civil commitment procedure, a person can be confined if
that person appears to be dangerous). Under the criminal commitment procedure, if a
person commits a crime and is diagnosed as mentally ill, commitment to a psychiatric
hospital is appropriate. Id.; Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra
note 19, at 639 (explaining that a person can be committed to a psychiatric hospital in
the Soviet Union under the Civil Procedure Code for "incorrect behavior"). In the
Soviet Union, this kind of behavior is believed to include an intent to harm someone,
steal, criticize the government, or incite protests. Id.; see also Osakwe, supra note 16,
at 269 (revealing that the determination of a person proclaimed mentally ill as being
dangerous does not actually matter because the diagnosis of mental illness itself justi-
fies compulsory commitment).
73. See How Psychiatry is Abused in the USSR, supra note 17, at 1-3 (stating
that despite regulations, patients often received no initial psychiatric examination, sec-
ond opinion, or information concerning their case); Comment, Human Rights in the
Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 840-42 (explaining that the procedural administration
of psychiatric treatment prevents patients from obtaining a lawyer). Once admitted to
the hospital, the patient has no right to appeal the commitment decision. Id. at 862;
Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 4
(explaining that patients do not have a right to know the results of psychiatric
examinations).
74. See Ellman, supra note 23, at 82 (describing the procedures and standards of
the 1971 Directive).
75. Id.
76. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 3 (asserting that officials can forcibly confine a person who presents an
"evident danger" to society).
77. Ellman, supra note 23, at 82; see supra note 76 and accompanying text (stating
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guage of the 1971 Directive gives the Soviet police broad discretion to
decide whether a person is dangerous .7  This decision-making process
for confinement permits police or psychiatrists to commit a person to a
psychiatric hospital based on their subjective belief that the person is
socially dangerous.79 The committing psychiatrist, however, must file a
report. Therefore, a commission of three other psychiatrists require a
second opinion within a twenty-four hour period to determine the valid-
ity of the commitment.80
The forced commitment of a person diagnosed as mentally ill may
occur without notification or consent of relatives.8' The regulations do
not provide the patient with the right of appeal or the right to legal
counsel.8 2 In addition, the description of symptoms that warrant forced
commitment is vague and imprecise.8 3 Significantly, this 1971 Directive
influenced the creation of special lists of individuals who received psy-
chiatric treatment, facilitating arbitrary recommitment!" Conse-
that patients considered an "evident danger" are forcibly confined in a psychiatric in-
stitution). Soviet officials consider a person an "evident danger" when leading or partic-
ipating in a protest against government policies.
78. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 8-9 (statement of Dr. Charles H. Fair-
banks, Jr.) (asserting that the broad terminology describing mental health conditionsjustifying commitment necessitates reliance upon the discretionary decisions of political
administrators); Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR,
supra note 17, at 3 (describing the police's power to carry out emergency confinement
under guidance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).
79. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 3 (explaining that the 1971 Directive permits the police to commit people to
mental hospitals if the police consider these people dangerous to themselves or others).
Ellman, supra note 23, at 82 (stating that a psychiatrist may use any nonconforming
behavior to justify committing a person to a mental hospital and that consultations on
this decision are not necessary).
80. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 4 (showing that despite adopted procedures, officials often violate them and
sometimes a person never receives any form of psychiatric examination or diagnosis).
81. See id. (revealing that the authorities rarely inform relatives of the related
committed person's status within the stipulated twenty-four hour period); How Psychi-
atry is Abused in the USSR, supra note 17, at 1-2 (demonstrating that in the case of
Anna Ivanovna, authorities decided that she was mentally ill because she complained
too much and committed her to a psychiatric hospital without consultation with her
relatives).
82. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 5 (claiming that the 1971 Directive indicates that although defense counsel
may be present at a patient's initial hearing, access to a lawyer is consistently denied,
and once confined, there is no recognized right to a lawyer or judicial intervention).
83. See Ellman, supra note 23, at 82 (analyzing that psychiatric professionals and
government officials exercise arbitrary discretion when deciding what symptoms to con-
sider indicative of a psychiatric abnormality requiring forced commitment). The termi-
nology of psychiatric rules do not clearly define symptoms indicative of mental illness
thereby allowing the arbitrary commitment of individuals to psychiatric institutions. Id.
84. Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note
17, at 4. Lists of those who received psychiatric treatment exist, giving authorities an
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quently, the 1971 Directive fails to provide people subject to psychiat-
ric treatment with any substantive rights.85
B. THE 1988 STATUTE
The Statute, passed in 1988, provides a comprehensive body of
guidelines to govern the treatment and commitment of psychiatric pa-
tients. 86 It is the first Soviet psychiatric assistance legislation to govern
the entire range of psychiatric commitment and treatment.87 Although
the Statute protects individual human rights in the administrative pro-
cedure, it continues to protect Soviet society from patients perceived to
be dangerous to themselves or others.88 Soviet officials indicate that a
major goal of the Statute is to reduce the number of people confined to
psychiatric hospitals and to remove their names from publicized patient
lists.89
C. A COMPARISON OF THE 1971 DIRECTIVE WITH THE 1988
STATUTE
The Statute incorporates civil rights and professional accountability
rules90 that are not addressed in the 1971 Directive, local hospital pro-
cedures, or public health rules. The Statute identifies a patient's right
to appeal commitment decisions and a right to legal counsel both
excuse to recommit listed people for further treatment. Id. Due to the lists of mentally
ill patients, the vague terminology defining behavior justifying forced commitment, and
the ease with which a person can be systematically recommitted, those with dissenting
opinions can easily become subject to compulsory psychiatric treatment. Id. at 4.
85. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (describing the tenets of the
1971 Directive).
86. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-14.
87. Id.; see Public 'Not Yet Ready' to Debate Psychiatry, supra note 2, at 62
(describing the 1988 Statute); Ready to Rejoin Association, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 18,
1988, at 80) (describing the comprehensive nature of the Statute pertaining to all as-
pects of psychiatric assistance); see also How Psychiatry is Abused in the USSR,
supra note 17, at 4 (discussing the fact that a statute similar to the 1988 Statute was
discussed in 1977, but Soviet officials did not approve it).
88. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-12.
89. No Political Prisoners Remain in Asylums, supra note 69, at 46. Chief Psychi-
atrist of the Ministry of Health Churkin claims that he will reduce the number of
names on the certified patient lists. Id.; see How Psychiatry is Abused in the USSR,
supra note 17, at 3 (reporting that Chief Psychiatrist Churkin seeks to have the non-
consensual confinement of patients limited to only those people who pose a direct threat
to themselves or to the lives of others).
90. See The New Legislation Regarding Psychiatric Help, supra note 8, at 4
(describing changes the new Statute imposes such as adding the right to appeal and
assistance of a lawyer, providing for a second professional opinion, and revising the
Criminal Code to include prohibition of professional malpractice).
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before and after commitment.91 The 1971 Directive mandated the ap-
pointment of a three person commission to review the decision to com-
mit a person. 92 The Statute not only includes provisions for this three
person commission, but also permits the patient to choose a psychiatrist
from that patient's community to serve on the commission.9 Under the
Statute, the patient's relatives must be notified of the patient's status
within one day of the forced commitment." In addition, diagnostic in-
formation must be made available to the patient." Furthermore, a pa-
tient who has been committed must receive periodic diagnostic exami-
nations, the goal of which is to facilitate the patient's release at the
earliest possible date. 8
Unlike the Statute, the 1971 Directive does not indicate that a pa-
tient has the right to appeal commitment decisions.9 The 1971 Direc-
tive places emphasis on a subjective determination of whether the pa-
tient is offending Soviet social or legal values in a manner considered
dangerous to Soviet society. 8 Although a commission of psychiatric
professionals must examine patients forcibly commited to psychiatric
hospitals, this requirement is not enforced under the 1971 Directive."
Without the provisions for both a periodic review and notice to the pa-
tient or relatives, the Directive does not protect individual patient
rights.100
91. Id. at 4; Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-12.
92. ElIman, supra note 23, at 82-83.
93. New Mental Health Regulations Take Effect, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 1. 1988,
at 3. The patients' relatives are guaranteed the right to aid the patient in selecting a
local psychiatrist to serve on the commission that reviews the patient's continued con-
finement. Id.
94. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 12.
95. Id. at 11-12. Patients admitted to a psychiatric hospital must be informed of
the reasons for the commitment decision within twenty-four hours after the initial ex-
amination. Id.
96. See Health Aide Cited on Psychiatric Reforms, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Apr. 12,
1988, at 9, 10 (explaining that Soviet officials claim legislation guaranteeing the civil
rights of patients will lead to the release of patients as soon as possible); see also Public
Not Yet Ready to Debate Psychiatry, supra note 2, at 61 (noting provisions of the
Statute that concentrate on assistance in the areas of jobs and housing to facilitate the
individual's adaption to a normal lifestyle after release from a psychiatric hospital).
97. See Ellman, supra note 23, at 82 (asserting that a person faces forcible con-
finement if considered dangerous and is released only when this danger is cured).
98. Id.
99. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 4 (commenting that procedures in the 1971 Directive are not enforced).
100. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 8-9 (statement of Dr. Charles H. Fair-
banks, Jr.) (stating that the vague terminology describing preconditions for commit-
ment leaves the loss of individual rights to discretionary whim); Ellman, supra note 23,
at 82-83 (documenting the arbitrary use of drugs on patients and the subjective power
of authorities to commit individuals to psychiatric hospitals).
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1. The 1988 Psychiatric Assistance Statute Expands the Guarantees
Under the 1971 Directive
In deviating from the 1971 Directive, the Statute empowers the pros-
ecutor's office to supervise the legality of administrative proceedings. 101
Furthermore, the role of the Ministry of Interior in the examination
and commitment of psychiatric patients is remanded to the Ministry of
Health." 2 This indicates that the Ministry of Interior will no longer
have total control over the "special" hospitals where its officials have in
the past used classification as mentally ill to confine dissidents.10 3 Most
significantly, the Statute imposes criminal liability, and, thus, a new
level of accountability, on professionals who commit malpractice in
committal, diagnostic, and treatment procedures.10 4 The Statute states
that future changes to the Soviet Criminal Code will reflect such pro-
fessional liability. 10 5
2. The 1988 Statute Is not Substantially Different From the 1971
Directive
Although the Statute introduces new concepts of patient rights and
professional accountability, its language is general and ambiguous in
parts. As with past Soviet legislation, the language justifying noncon-
sensual psychiatric commitment is particularly ambiguous. The Statute
uses nebulous terms to describe the person it considers dangerous to
society.' 0 6 Similar to the 1971 Directive, the Statute also allows for a
101. New Mental Health Regulations Take Effect, supra note 66, at 50.
102. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note 28,
at 1048 (announcing the issuance of a Soviet government statement that places all
psychiatric hospitals under the control of the Ministry of Health).
103. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 65 (statement of Professor Harvey Fire-
side) (explaining that "special" hospitals are used to forcibly commit dissidents).
104. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 13; see The New Legislation
Regarding Psychiatric Help, supra note 8, at 4 (indicating that punishment for mal-
practice may include imprisonment for two years); New Mental Health Regulations
Take Effect, supra note 66, at 50 (observing that the public prosecutor's office will
monitor the legality of professional psychiatric activities).
105. See Psychiatric "Errors, Malpractices" Redressed, supra note 3, at 27 (re-
porting that the Soviet Presidium's introduction of amendments to the Criminal Code
will apply to those persons committing malpractice or aiding in the commitment of
healthy people to mental institutions). THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE
RSFSR (amended 1960), art. 70, THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 157-317 (H. Berman &
J. Spindler trans. & W. Simons ed. 1984) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE].
106. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 14 (responding to criticism
that Soviet clinical diagnoses justifies forcible commitment of mentally healthy dissi-
dents). Officials of the Ministry of Health claim that "purely litigious behavior by no
means requires medical intervention." Id.; see JAPUP Information Bulletin No. 18,
supra note 49, at 2 (placing more emphasis on whether violations of rules of the Soviet
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broad spectrum of people to be considered mentally ill and socially
dangerous enough to warrant forcible commitment. Furthermore, the
Statute merely encourages, instead of requires, psychiatrists and
mental health professionals to demonstrate concern for the well-being
of psychiatric patients and to help them adapt to society.107 Although
the Statute discourages abuses of individual civil rights, it fails to pro-
pose concrete steps to monitor the protection of these rights. 03 Finally,
although the Ministry of Health now controls all psychiatric institu-
tions, no evidence of change exists in the administrative staff.'0°
The changes in past practices which occur through the implementa-
tion of the Statute will help to show whether it substantially differs
from the 1971 Directive.110 More time must pass, however, before the
effects of the Statute on Soviet human rights practices can be conclu-
sively measured."1 Thus far, a lack of qualified candidates has caused
the Ministry of Health to laboriously struggle to fill newly created ad-
ministrative positions. 1 12 Despite this problem, however, the Ministry of
socialist society occur rather than on the mental state of the person); Politics and So-
viet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (explaining that the broad definition of the
mental illness termed schizophrenia encompasses behavior apparent in those who ex-
press dissenting opinions in Soviet society).
107. See Psychiatrist Answers Questions on New Law, supra note 7, at 50 (stating
that under the new Statute, professionals and administrators have a moral obligation to
protect the freedoms of their patients); Psychiatric "Errors. Malpractices" Redressed,
supra note 3, at 27 (indicating that there is a duty to correctly apply rules to the
treatment of patients).
108. See Public 'Not Yet Ready' to Debate Psychiatry, supra note 2, at 62 (argu-
ing that the creation of the position of Chief Psychiatrist is the only major administra-
tive change concerning the government's accountability); see also Health Offcial Dis-
cusses New Psychiatry Law, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 7, 1988, at 34 (reporting that the
USSR Procuracy will carry out monitoring despite the fact that procedures are not yet
specified).
109. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note
28, at 1048 (explaining that personnel from the Ministry of the Interior remain in their
positions at the institutions); Gumbel, Critics Doubt Soviet Psychiatry Reformed, Wall
St. J., Feb. 2, 1989, at A6 (characterizing changes in the system as merely "cosmetic"
because most officials retain their same jobs).
110. See Gumbel, supra note 109, at A6 (describing the Soviet government's ef-
forts to comply with the new legislation as exemplified in the release of "dozens of
patients thought by the West to have been wrongly confined"); Superpowers Seek Ac-
cord on Visiting Mental Hospitals, supra note 49, at 1 (noting that new safeguards
have led to the release of patients and a decrease in the number of dissidents commit-
ted to psychiatric hospitals); Psychiatric Abuse in the USSR, supra note 2, at 3 (as-
serting that the release of "250 prisoners of conscience [in 19871, the largest contingent
since the 1950s" shows the potential effect in the Soviet view of the Psychiatric Assis-
tance Statute on the treatment of the mentally ill).
111. See Maksimova, supra note 70, at 14 (detailing a two year experiment in
progress where patients are released and allowed to voluntarily seek psychiatric
assistance).
112. First Changes, 15 CURRENT DIG. SovieT PRESS 22 (1988) (offering an asser-
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Health is actively reviewing patient registration lists and decreasing the
number of names registered thereon." Overall, internal conflict among
professionals, concerning the means to address questions of patient
abuse, may frustrate the possibility of major changes in the administra-
tion of psychiatric law." 4
D. THE STATUTE'S EFFECT ON PSYCHIATRIC LAW AND ITS
POLITICAL USE TO CONTROL DISSENT
Psychiatric law and treatment in the Soviet Union became a subject
of international concern primarily due to the Soviet practice of using
psychiatry to control political dissent." 5 When dissident groups in the
Soviet Union became more organized and vocal during the 1960s and
1970s, the government, in an effort to supress dissent, increased the use
of psychiatric commitment of dissidents and abusive treatment of those
committed." 6 Thus, it became a common occurrence for Soviet govern-
ment authorities, often with the assistance of psychiatric professionals,
to label politically bothersome people as mentally ill and to confine
tion from the government controlled news service that requirements for the Chief Psy-
chiatrist are so strenuous that qualified people are difficult to find for the positions).
113. Public 'Not Yet Ready' to Debate Psychiatry, supra note 2, at 62. In 1986
and 1987, in anticipation of the Psychiatric Assistance Statute, 9000 names were re-
moved from the patient registration lists that are used to label patients as mentally ill
and that justify on-going observation and arbitrary treatment. Id.
114. See Stoel, supra note 18, at 75-76 (reporting that psychiatrists at the Serbyski
Institute, originally under the control of the Ministry of Interior, claim that psychiatric
practices are legal, legitimate, and professionally sound in contrast to the views of the
visiting delegation).
115. See S. BLOCH & P. REDDAWAY, SOVIET PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE 20-21 (1985)
[hereinafter BLOCH & REDDAWAY] (highlighting the details of the psychiatric confine-
ment of prominent dissidents in the 1960s that led to international recognition and
publicity concerning Soviet abuse of psychiatric practices). Soviet dissidents publicized
the Soviet abuse of psychiatry in the 1960s to encourage western scrutiny. Id. at 21.
116. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 8 (statement of Dr. Charles H. Fair-
banks, Jr.) (defining psychiatric abuse as "the diagnosis of sane dissenters as mentally
ill, and their punishment in psychiatric hospitals," which is abusive treatment). The
Soviet Union has persecuted dissidents since the beginning of the 1900s. Id. at 7-8. In
the 1950s and 1960s, under less restrictive governments, dissidents were able to become
more vocal; and, subsequently, psychiatric abuse became a common method of control-
ling dissidents. Id. at 48-50 (statement of Peter Reddaway) (explaining that Soviet
confinement of healthy dissidents in psychiatric hospitals began extensively in the
1960s); see also Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR,
supra note 17, at 1-10 (observing numerous incidents during the 1970s of confinement
of mentally healthy dissidents); Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union: The
Policy of Dissimulation, supra note 17, at 854-55 (defining the term dissident as any-
one that the Soviet government classifies as opposed to the Soviet Communist party);
cf. Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 637 (examining an
increasing international awareness of Soviet psychiatric abuses of individual rights).
Since 1960, the number of dissidents committed to psychiatric institutions has in-
creased. Id. at 629-30.
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them to psychiatric institutions. 17 This was an attractive option for the
Soviet government because of the discretionary nature of psychiatric
law and regulations.118 Although arresting and sentencing political dis-
sidents attracted negative publicity,119 a finding of mental illness effec-
tively permitted officials to circumvent a trial and avoid public
scrutiny.1 20
Commitment to psychiatric hospitals under civil law became an easy
way to remove dissidents from society and label them as troublemakers,
even after their release.1 21 In addition, the Soviet Criminal Code pro-
vides for commitment. 22 Once committed to a psychiatric hospital, dis-
117. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 8 (statement of Dr. Charles H. Fair-
banks, Jr.) (asserting that psychiatric abuse is a convenient way to incapacitate politi-
cal dissidents); see also Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, supra note 16,
at 862-63 (stating that dissidents held as psychiatric patients are not released until they
reject their dissident views); Ellman, supra note 23, at 84 (explaining that a person can
be committed to a psychiatric hospital for simply complaining frequently to
authorities).
118. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 8-9, 26-27 (statement of Dr. Charles H.
Fairbanks, Jr.) (suggesting that Soviet officials have virtually unlimited discretion to
confine dissidents, and letter from the All-Union Society of Neuropathologists and Psy-
chiatrists stating that abuse of psychiatry does not exist because of the ethical concerns
of Soviet psychiatrists). Government officials use psychiatric diagnostic practices to cir-
cumvent a political dissident's rights to trial proceedings. Id. at 8; Osakwe, supra note
16, at 284-85 (explaining that Soviet laws are subject to discretionary interpretation,
and dissidents' legal rights are not protected because of the negative use of this discre-
tionary power); see also Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, supra note 16,
at 861 (demonstrating that confining dissidents in psychiatric hospitals is an attractive
option because it does not violate criminal law); Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric
Commitment, supra note 19, at 632-37 (examining the nature of control that the So-
viet State exhibits over psychiatric practices); Politics and Soviet Society, supra note
18, at 552 (concluding that the clinical definition of schizophrenia in the Soviet Union
is broad enough to cover almost any dissident behavior).
119. See Grigoriants, supra note 64, at A31 (reporting that the Soviet government
finds it easier to justify psychiatric commitment of dissidents rather than explain prison
sentences). Commitment to psychiatric hospitals is a fairly easy process because "any-
one with some sort of standing in society or who simply knows doctors and psychiatrists
can do it." Id.
120. Id.
121. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 7-11 (statement of Dr. Charles H. Fair-
banks, Jr.) (explaining that substituting psychiatric professionals' opinion for the trial
procedure facilitates the commitment of dissidents to mental hospitals for an unspeci-
fied period of time); Ellman, supra note 23, at 84 (indicating that entire groups of
protestors can suddenly be committed); Grigoriants, supra note 64, at A31 (explaining
that it is easier to incapacitate someone as opposed to going through a lengthy trial
procedure because anyone can label a person as mentally ill and facilitate psychiatric
commitment); see also Psychiatry Defended, Reforms Suggested, F.B.I.S.--SOV,
June 3, 1988, at 75, 76 (offering an official Soviet view that the Soviet Union uses
psychiatry to suppress political dissidents).
122. Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 639-
40 (describing articles of the Soviet Criminal Code that make it a crime to disseminate
anti-Soviet falsehoods or to agitate or propagandize for the purpose of subverting or
weakening the nation). CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 70; see Osakwe, supra note
1989]
640 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 4:617
sident patients are subjected to harsh drug treatments 123 and to therapy
intended to change their politically deviant thoughts and behavior. 1 24
When abusive Soviet practices that use psychiatry to control political
dissent increased, international organizations expressed growing con-
cern. 125 Meanwhile, Soviet psychiatrists, such as Anatoly Koryagin, ex-
amined political dissidents whom the government labeled mentally ill
and found them mentally healthy. 12
16, at 285 (analyzing the discretionary power of the Soviet government to accuse at
will people of crimes). Socialism dictates a belief in sovereignty and superior discretion
of Soviet government officials because of the theory of the government's superiority
over individual rights. Id.
123. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 9-I1 (statement of Dr. Charles H. Fair-
banks, Jr.) (reporting that the administering of insulin and sulfazin in unhealthy doses
occurs in Soviet psychiatric hospitals); id. at 66 (statement of Professor Harvey Fire-
side) (explaining that drugs are used in tortuous dosages to punish patients); Grigori-
ants, supra note 64, at A31 (indicating that compulsory treatment includes a standard-
ized treatment for all patients with painful and harmful magnesium sulfate injections);
Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (reporting that psychiatric hospi-
tals subjected dissidents to harmful drug therapy and physical abuse such as being
wrapped in wet canvas).
124. See Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 862-63(stating that patients are not considered healthy or released from the hospital until
they conform their opinions). Ironically, suppressing dissent, the government gives the
impression that they fear the dissident's discontent will spread. Id.; Public 'Not Yet
Ready' to Debate Psychiatry, supra note 2, at 62 (arguing in reaction to criticism that
Soviet psychiatrists do not use drugs to punish dissidents, but to make them func-
tional); Psychiatry Defended, Reforms Suggested, supra note 121, at 76 (observing
Soviet official's claims that the commitment of healthy dissidents is a rare mistake and
not meant to change behavior); BLOCH & REDDAWAY, supra note 115, at 30 (explain-
ing that dissidents subject to psychiatric abuse are usually supporters of human rights
and a democratization process, and, thus, urge the Soviet government to comply with
its constitution). The lead psychiatrists who commit dissidents to psychiatric hospitals
are typically party administrators. Id. at 36-38.
125. See Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (reporting that a
decrease in the number of cases of psychiatric abuses in the past few years is due
partially to the involvement of international organizations, including the WPA). The
WPA expressed criticisms of the Soviet Union's psychiatric practices in the late 1970s
as reports of abuses increased. Id.; Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychia-
try in the USSR, supra note 17, at 20 (noting that the WPA's condemnation of psychi-
atric abuse instigated the involvement of many international groups in the issue).
126. Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 6. Dr. Anatoly Koryagin, a Soviet psychiatrist who is an active opponent of
Soviet psychiatric abuse, examined fifteen dissidents diagnosed as mentally ill and at
one time forcibly confined to a hospital and concluded that forced confinement was not
medically justified. Id. Dr. Koryagin was subsequently imprisoned for the publication
of his findings. Id.; see Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra
note 19, at 630 (reporting that western psychiatrists examined Soviet dissidents and
found no evidence of mental illness); see also Amnesty International, Political Abuse
of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 74 (revealing numerous cases of dissi-
dents whom Soviet officials diagnosed as mentally ill and dangerous enough to warrant
psychiatric commitment). Western experts later diagnosed these dissidents as either
mentally healthy or not dangerous. Id. One "patient," dissident Major General Peter
Grigorenko, faced forcible confinement in a mental hospital, and, upon release, mem-
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The Statute is designed to prevent not only administrative inconsis-
tencies, but also abusive practices such as the use of psychiatry to con-
trol dissent.1 17 The Statute solves some of these problems when it as-
signs criminal liability to those who knowingly commit healthy people
to psychiatric hospitals.128 Soviet officials, however, are inconsistent in
their analysis of the psychiatric law and dissident problem, refusing to
agree that such abuse of psychiatry exists.'2 9 Unless Soviet officials
concede that they use psychiatry for political purposes, it is unlikely
that the Statute will serve to remedy past psychiatric abuse of dissi-
dents. Moreover, Soviet sovereign concerns for the promotion of social-
ist ideological goals and the classification of dissent as a crime, will
limit the implementation of the tenets of the Statute. 3 '
bers of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) examined him and found no signs
of mental illness. Id. Evgeny Nikoldev, a 43-year-old linguist considered "socially dan-
gerous" and confined in a psychiatric hospital for years, was found to be harmless when
a Soviet psychiatrist who opposed Soviet psychiatric abuse examined him. Id. Vladimir
Borisov, a human rights activist labeled mentally ill and forcibly confined to a mental
hospital reported that an institutional psychiatrist told him: "Borisov, you're a normal
fellow and I am sure that you don't want to be sent to a madhouse. Why don't you
change your views?" Id. at 75; Psychiatric Abuse, Helsinki Watch, Feb. 22, 1988, at 5
(explaining that Helsinki Watch learned of ninety people imprisoned in psychiatric
hospitals because of their religious beliefs); Psychiatrists Conduct News Conference:
Admit "Official" Pressure, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Feb. 18, 1988, at 80. Soviet psychiatrists
admitted that "official bodies" influenced some psychiatrists' decisions, but denied
KGB involvement. Id.; see also Psychiatry Defended, Reforms Suggested, supra note
121, at 75 (arguing that critics of Soviet practices make sensational cases of mistaken
commitment to hospitals). See generally BLOCH & REDDAWAY, supra note 115, at 1-
95 (highlighting numerous cases of Soviet psychiatric abuse). Viktor Davydov was a
victim of Soviet psychiatric abuse. Id. at 30. Despite the fact that a number of psychia-
trists considered him mentally healthy, he was labeled as mildly schizophrenic. Id. at
30. Soviet officials determined that "[i]n view of the great social danger he represents
he needs to undergo compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital of special type." Id.
127. See supra note 16, 22 and accompanying text (describing international pres-
sures to reform treatment of dissidents).
128. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-12.
129. See Superpowers Seek Accord on Visiting Mental Hospitals, supra note 49,
at 8 (reporting that Soviet officials deny the existence of government-ordered psychiat-
ric confinements). G. Morozov, Director of the Serbysky Institute of Forensic Psychia-
try in Moscow, claims that abuses do not exist. Id. Although some officials state that
abuses never existed, others state that all healthy dissidents have been released. Id.; No
Political Prisoners Remain in Asylums, supra note 69, at 46 (offering comments from
Chief Psychiatrist Churkin, admitting that state psychiatric wards had healthy people
in them). Churkin declared that there are no longer any political prisoners being held
in Soviet psychiatric institutions. Id.; Psychiatry Defended, Reforms Suggested, supra
note 121, at 80 (asserting that only a few cases involve wrongful commitment); Soviet
Attitude "Changed", F.B.I.S.--SOV, Feb. 2, 1988, at 16 (reporting that in answer to
criticisms of Soviet practices, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Health denied
problems regarding the abuse of psychiatry); see also Comment, Soviet Abuse of Psy-
chiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 636 (stating that in 1959, Kruschev announced
that political prisoners no longer exist).
130. See Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (stating that many
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The language of the Statute provides that people can be committed
to a psychiatric hospital if categorized as socially dangerous. 131 This
language bears similarity with the language from the 1971 Directive. 132
Therefore, discretionary freedoms may still permit Soviet officials to
use psychiatry to suppress political dissent. In addition, the Soviet
clinical concept of mental illness evolved to include a new illness called
sluggish schizophrenia that incorporates symptoms mirroring dissenting
behavior. 3 3 Changes in the treatment of dissidents have not yet shown
conclusive evidence of reform, although the number of dissidents com-
mitted to hospitals has declined. 34
Soviet psychiatrists actually believe that dissidents are mentally ill). Compare Com-
ment, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment, supra note 19, at 639 (asserting that
violation of criminal laws can occur if it is demonstrated that dissident behavior weak-
ens the Soviet State politically) with Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union,
supra note 16, at 859 (explaining that the Soviet government's tactic of repressing
dissent through psychiatric confinement will ultimately injure the Soviet goal of
communism).
131. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text (discussing the 1971 Directive).
Compare Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-13 (referring to provision
nine of the Statute and stating that "a person who commits actions that give sufficient
reason to suppose that he has a pronounced mental disorder and at the same time
violates public order or the rules of socialist society, and also represents an immediate
danger to those around him, may be subjected to an initial psychiatric examination
without his consent . . . .") with Ellman, supra note 23, at 82 (reporting that under
the 1971 Directive, a "mentally ill person could be unwillingly confined to a psychiatric
hospital if he or she were considered dangerous").
132. See IAPUP Information Bulletin No. 18, supra note 49, at 2 (placing priority
on whether the rules of socialist society are violated, rather than on concern for the
mental state of the subject); Politics and Soviet Society, supra note 18, at 552 (ex-
plaining that the broad definition of schizophrenia encompasses people expressing dis-
senting opinions).
133. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 36-39 (statement of Dr. Walter Reich)
(presenting leading Soviet psychiatrist Snezhnevsky's view on mild forms of schizophre-
nia, that Western psychiatrists reject, and encompassing what many professionals con-
sider normalcies); Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (commenting
that defining schizophrenia in broad terms makes it hard to separate political dissidents
from those who are mentally ill). Soviet psychiatrists may easily commit dissidents due
to the broad clinical definition of schizophrenia. Id.; Amnesty International, Political
Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 10 (indicating that a leading
psychiatrist at the Serbsky Institute uses the concept of "sluggish schizophrenia" to
justify compulsory confinement of known dissidents).
134. See Health Aide Cited on Psychiatric Reforms, supra note 96, at 10 (report-
ing that Soviet officials contend that the abuse of dissidents will no longer exist because
of the placing of all psychiatric hospitals under the control of the Ministry of Health,
and not the Ministry of the Interior). The Chief Psychiatrist of the Ministry of Health
reports the 1988 release of many dissidents confined to hospitals. Id.; COUNTRY RE-
PORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note 28, at 1045 (showing that
changing practices in the Soviet Union led to fewer cases of dissident imprisonment).
Soviet officials however, have employed alternative means to restrict dissent. Id.; see
also Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551 (stating that it is difficult to
measure effects of the Psychiatric Assistance Statute, but confirming that at least
ninety-five dissidents were still confined in 1988). If administrative leadership within
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III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE REFORMS THAT MAY
FACILITATE IMPLEMENTATION
In the Soviet domestic legal sphere, new laws support the tenets of
the Statute. Changes include: first, a recently ratified appeals law,1ea
second, relaxation of restrictions on legal counsel practices, 3 and
third, amendments to the Criminal Code.1 37 This additional legislation
is an element of the glasnost 38 reforms created to eliminate adminis-
trative and bureaucratic inefficiencies and extend democracy. 39 Al-
though these changes appear to promote protection of individual free-
doms described in the Statute, their effectiveness is questionable due to
inherent limitations on their applicability to Soviet society.
A. THE LAW ON APPEALS
On January 1, 1988, the Soviet Union implemented an appeals law
to allow people the right to challenge decisions of individual officials
that appear incorrect or unsubstantiated.140 The law provides prompt
remedy to those subjected to illegal conduct at the discretion of admin-
istrators in the Soviet bureaucracy.' 4 ' On its face, this law appears to
complement the Statute because it provides a procedure to appeal the
decisions of psychiatrists or mental health administrators. The Statute
refers to this appeals law as the appropriate legal procedure to follow if
psychiatric organizations does not change, western analysts fear that the Statute will
not be enforced. Id. at 552; Grigoriants, supra note 64, at A31 (claiming that Soviet
officials plan to take two million patients off the official register that is used to facilitate
confinement of persons to psychiatric hospitals).
135. Law On Appealing Officials' Illegal Actions, supra note 21, at 12-13.
136. See Maksimova, supra note 70, at 14 (describing an interview with a Soviet
official who discusses new legal rights for patients).
137. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 70; see Drafting of New Criminal Code Ex-
plained, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 4, 1988, at 58, 59 (explaining the proposed changes to
the Criminal Code seeking to protect individual rights).
138. Quigley, supra note 1, at 460.
139. Law on Individual Rights Takes Effect, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Jan. 21, 1988, at 49,
50 (explaining that appeals law and other reforms are an attempt to extend democracy
to the Soviet people under the guise of the "glasnost" policy); see Quigley, supra note
1, at 460 (describing that "glasnost" reforms have provided Soviet citizens with more
rights to sue).
140. Law on Appealing Officials' Illegal Actions, supra note 21, at 12-13; see Law
on Individual Rights Takes Effect, supra note 139, at 49-50 (noting that the appeals
law became effective on January 1, 1988, to protect individuals from bureaucratic and
administrative illegalities); Quigley, supra note 1, at 461 (enumerating an individual
right to sue inherent in the appeals law); Quigley, New Soviet Law, supra note 21, at
172 (stating that the appeals law provides individuals with a right to sue Soviet
bureaucrats).
141. See Law on Appealing Officials' Illegal Actions, supra note 21, at 13 (defin-
ing a specific time period when the complaint may be filed).
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a person suspects unlawful action.142 Significantly, the existence of a
complementary law identifying a right of appeal substantiates the right
of judicial intervention into matters concerning the Soviet government
and its administrative behavior. 143
Although the appeals law gives legal significance to the right to ap-
peal outlined in the Statute, it also imposes limitations. Specifically, the
appeals law only permits a person to appeal actions or decisions of indi-
vidual Soviet officials.' A person cannot appeal a decision of a com-
mission or government board. 45 Therefore, this law limits the Statute's
proclaimed right of appeal. 46 Such a restraint on the right to appeal
makes it difficult for patients to seek a remedy against an abusive or
unlawful official government group, such as the three person psychiat-
ric commitment commission, because they can only base their appeal
on the actions of individuals within the group. The commission of psy-
chiatrists, a group immune to appeals, reviews original commitment de-
cisions made by individual psychiatrists. As a result, patients may not
use this right to appeal to reverse the decisions of the reviewing
committees.147
B. REFORMS IN THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In 1988, the Soviet government recognized a more expansive right of
lawyers to represent their client's interests. 48 Specifically, language
was added to the law governing the bar which was designed to guaran-
tee that Soviet attorneys may defend any client they choose without
142: Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 15. A person may appeal to
the court for remedy if a Soviet official has infringed upon that person's civil rights.
Law on Appealing Officials' Illegal Actions, supra note 21, at 12.
143. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 461 (noting that the appeals law expands the
circumstances under which a person may sue Soviet officials for illegal behavior).
144. Law On Appealing Officials' Illegal Actions, supra note 25, at 12 (indicating
that article 1 of the appeals law limits the right of appeal to complaints against individ-
uals); see Quigley, supra note 1, at 461 (explaining that an individual can bring a suit
only if it involves an accusation against specific government officials). An individual is
precluded from bringing a suit against a whole agency. Id.
145. Law On Appealing Officials' Illegal Actions, supra note 21, at 12-15.
146. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 461 (stating that individuals are not accountable
for the illegal action of a government organization); see also Quigley, New Soviet Law,
supra note 21, at 177 (claiming that the appeals law will strengthen the role of the
judiciary in Soviet society).
147. See Quigley, New Soviet Law, supra note 21, at 177 (reporting that the Soviet
chair of the Legislative Proposals Commission believes that the law will only succeed if
lawyers and judges are bold and take the initiative to enforce it).
148. See Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 13 (citing an interview




fear of reprisal from government officials.149 Amendments to the law
governing the bar propose that defense lawyers should defend the rights
of citizens faced with mandatory psychiatric treatment.50 This specific
reference to psychiatric assistance complements the appeals law and
the Statute because it supports an individual's right to counsel.101
The complementary changes in legislation manifested in the Statute,
appeals law, and law governing the bar indicate a possible change in
the Soviet government's attitude toward human rights.102 Yet, the his-
torical treatment of political dissidents poses strong barriers which gov-
ernment authorities must overcome in order to effectively implement
the new legislation. 153 Enforcement of the tenets of the Statute, guar-
anteeing individual rights of appeal and legal representation, will de-
pend upon whether the Soviet government reforms its practice of exer-
cising political control over the legal profession.'" The Soviet legal
profession is subject to government pressures that encourage lawyers to
refrain from defending dissident clients unless the lawyers follow gov-
ernment direction.1 55 An example of government control over the legal
profession is the requirement for lawyers to disclose the identities of
their clients to the state.156 Moreover, lawyers must acquire a special
government clearance to represent dissidents.5 The Soviet government
149. Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Bar in the USSR,
Pravda, Dec. 3, 1979, at 2-3 [in Russian], trans. in The Law on the Bar, 32 CURRENT
DIG. SOVIET PRESS 16, 16 (1980) [hereinafter The Law on the Bar]; Psychiatric Assis-
tance Statute, supra note 1, at 14.
150. The Law on the Bar, supra note 154, at 16-18; Psychiatric Assistance Statute,
supra note 1, at 14.
151. The Law on the Bar, supra note 149, at 16-18; see Psychiatric Assistance
Statute, supra note 1, at 11-12 (explaining that a patient has a right or to appeal and a
right to legal counsel).
152. See Quigley, New Soviet Law, supra note 21, at 177 (stating that the right to
defense counsel will aid in supporting an equitable legal process in all areas of society);
supra notes 106-20 and 139-50 and accompanying text (describing changes to the law
on the bar and the law on appeals under the Statute).
153. See Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 842(stating that prior to adoption of the right to legal counsel, lawyers seldom represented
dissidents at political trials because of the fear of professional repercussions). If chosen
to represent such people, lawyers felt compelled to convince their clients to plead
guilty. Id. Defense lawyers could not defend their clients to the best of their ability. Id.
Moreover, attorneys who represented clients in political trials risked falling into disfa-
vor with government officials at great cost to their careers. Id.
154. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RiGHrs PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note
28, at 1052 (showing that attorneys face pressure from the Soviet government to act in
compliance with official government policies).
155. See Barry, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1968)
(explaining that the Soviet government limits the independent actions of attorneys).
156. See id. (indicating that lawyers must submit information to the Soviet govern-
ment and are subject to government scrutiny).
157. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note
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maintains that the law governing the bar will eliminate the political
control of government authorities over lawyers and their clients.0 8
Before lawyers, however, can effectively represent politically controver-
sial clients, Soviet authorities must show a willingness to be open to
changes in the treatment of individuals subjected to psychiatric
treatment. 159
C. POTENTIAL REVISIONS TO THE CRIMINAL CODE
In addition to the reforms in Soviet domestic law, amendments pro-
posed to the Criminal Code seek to establish legal guarantees of human
rights. 160 Specifically, Soviet officials claim that amendments to the
Criminal Code will decrease commitment of dissidents to psychiatric
hospitals and protect human rights guaranteed under Soviet law.' The
proposed revisions plan to improve an attorney's access to criminal de-
fendants 62 and impute criminal liability for those who illegally commit
healthy people to mental institutions. 63 Although the draft of the
amended Criminal Code stipulates these human rights reforms, its ef-
fect on the professional accountability of mental health professionals
and officials cannot be assured until the amendments are adopted and
implemented. Legal reforms in the appeals law, law governing the bar,
and Criminal Codes present guarantees that relate to the tenets of the
28, at 1052 (arguing that attorneys need to obtain a special government clearance to
represent dissident clients, and they risk professional ruin if they do not act in accor-
dance with Soviet government mandates).
158. See Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 13 (stating that under the
new reforms, defense lawyers will have the freedom to choose who they represent).
159. See Comment, Human Rights in the Soviet Union, supra note 16, at 842
(suggesting that without specifically enforced rules, government pressure will continue
to influence attorneys in their defense of clients).
160. See Drafting of New Criminal Code Explained, supra note 137, at 58 (guar-
anteeing implementation of punishments for crimes against peace and humanity such
as psychiatric abuse of dissidents that will protect human rights); Jost, supra note 1, at
28 (explaining that the proposed reforms will prevent the abuse of psychiatry).
161. See Jost, supra note 1, at 28 (suggesting that the new reforms make it more
difficult for Soviet officials to circumvent the criminal justice system); Further on Law
on Revisions, F.B.I.S.-SOV, Mar. 9, 1988, at 12 (explaining that the Soviet Criminal
Code was amended to democratize and humanize the criminal system).
162. See Jost, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing that the reforms allow attorneys ac-
cess to defendants).
163. See Psychiatric "Errors, Malpractices" Redressed, supra note 3, at 27 (ex-
plaining that the goal of the proposed amendments is to create criminal liability for
people who knowingly commit healthy people to psychiatric hospitals); Jost, supra note
1, at 23 (commenting that the goal of the amendments is to facilitate the release of
political prisoners and eradicate the abuse of psychiatry that prevents individuals from
obtaining judicial intervention); see also Drafting of New Criminal Code Explained,
supra note 135, at 59 (describing that the goal of the Criminal Code is to guarantee
conformance to laws and to protect individual procedural rights).
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Statute.164 The ability of these code reforms to protect and legitimize
rights guaranteed in the Statute depends upon whether the government
permits individuals protection under these laws. It also depends on
whether additional government policies defining the sphere of applica-
tion of the Statute are articulated and implemented."0 5
IV. INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY OF SOVIET
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT
International organizations and foreign psychiatric associations scru-
tinize psychiatric treatment in the Soviet Union that allegedly infringes
upon individual rights.1 6 Increased Soviet concern over the opinions of
foreign states in recent years, especially western states, has prompted
Soviet leaders to be more willing to resolve issues that excite interna-
tional fervor.1 17 Abusive psychiatric treatment of dissidents is a human
164. See Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11-12 (guaranteeing a
right to legal defense and the right to appeal the decisions of individual officials and
providing for criminal liability of mental health professionals in appropriate cases).
165. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, supra note
28, at 1045 (detailing advances in the protection of human rights in the Soviet Union
and explaining that the effects of recent reforms will not be known until the revised
Soviet Criminal Code is implemented).
166. See 'Anti-Soviet Chorus' at Psychiatric Meeting, 29 CURRENT DIG. SovIEr
PRESS 1, 1-3 (Oct. 19, 1977) (explaining dissatisfaction in the Soviet Union with inter-
national input concerning its psychiatric practices); Soviet Psychiatrists Leave World
Body, 35 CURRENT DIG. SOVIE PRESS 1, 1-3 (Apr. 27, 1983) (reporting that after
resigning from the WPA, Soviet officials expressed concern over international interfer-
ence in its treatment of psychiatric individuals); see also Ellman, supra note 23, at 85
(stating that as early as 1973, intense international publicity concerned Soviet psychia-
trists who sought to explain the relationship between mental illness and anti-social be-
havior). Soviet psychiatrists explained that dissenting behavior may appear to represent
mental health, but such anti-social outbreaks are really a sign of illness. Id. at 83. In
reaction to reports of psychiatric abuse, the WPA demanded Soviet reform. Id. at 85;
Osakwe, supra note 16, at 287 (explaining that the Helsinki Watch groups publicized
the lack of Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act); Sharansky, supra note 23,
at § 4 (stating that improved United States-Soviet relations should be tied to Soviet
compliance with the Helsinki Accords); Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psy-
chiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 20 (asserting that in response to reports of
psychiatric abuse, the WPA created a committee to monitor Soviet practices, but when
they requested reports on alleged dissidents, the Soviets replied slowly); Ready to Re-
join Association, supra note 87, at 80 (stating that in response to international concern
over psychiatric abuse of dissidents, Soviet authorities have agreed to permit foreign
psychiatrists to visit and examine Soviet psychiatric patients); Meet With Psychiatrists,
F.B.I.S.--SOV, Jan. 28, 1988, at 15 (explaining that the Soviet government's concern
for human rights practices is in evidence when they invite the Helsinki Rights Commit-
tee to visit and meet with Soviet psychiatrists).
167. See Bloed, Recent Developments in Soviet Attitudes Towards the Interna-
tional Protection of Human Rights, 6 NErH. Q. HuM. R. 80, 82 (1988) (reporting that
in sponsoring a resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in
1987, the Soviet Union supported the right of individual appeal to demonstrate concern
for human rights and to appease foreign organizations); 2 Million to Quit Soviet
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
rights issue that elicits a strong international demand for reform.""8 In-
ternational organizations, principally the World Psychiatric Association
(WPA), 69 Amnesty International, 70 International Association for the
Political Use of Psychiatry (I.A.P.U.P.),' 7 ' and the Royal Commission
of Psychiatrists of Great Britain, 72 research and report on the political
use of psychiatry to control dissent and related deficiencies in the So-
viet legal system.
A. THE WPA's INFLUENCE ON PSYCHIATRIC REFORM
The WPA is an association of national psychiatric organizations,
which exerts an authoritative influence on world-wide psychiatric prac-
tices. 73 The Soviet Union views membership in the WPA as necessary
to assure Soviet influence in the development of international policy
concerning psychiatric practices. 74 The WPA reacts strongly to reports
of the misuse of psychiatry to control dissent in the Soviet Union;175 in
earlier years it formed an investigative committee to study this prob-
lem. 1 In 1977, the WPA submitted a resolution to the Soviet Union
Mental-Patient Rolls, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1988, at A32 (indicating that the Soviet
Union is showing a desire to rejoin the WPA).
168. See Superpowers Seek Accord on Visiting Mental Hospital, supra note 49, at
1 (stating that the APA made requests to examine Soviet psychiatric patients); Politics
and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551-52 (observing that the WPA expects the
Soviet Union to reform its psychiatric practices before being readmitted); Amnesty
International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 1-18 (re-
porting that Amnesty International and the APA sent letters to Soviet officials and
publicized reports of abuse).
169. See Ellman, supra note 23, at 85 (explaining the influence of the WPA on
Soviet reform and defining the goals of the organization).
170. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 20 (explaining that the WPA incited international concern for Soviet psy-
chiatric abuse).
171. See Psychiatric Abuse in the USSR, supra note 2, at 3 (describing IAPUP as
an organization that exerts international influence on the Soviet government).
172. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 19-20 (statement of Harold Vistosky,
M.D.) (describing the role of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in Great Britain and
its influence on the Soviet Union).
173. Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 1-2. The publicity of the WPA's Sixth Conference, where WPA members
criticized psychiatric practices in the Soviet Union, heightened the concern of other
international organizations. Id.
174. See Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (stating that the
Soviet Union would welcome the opportunity to re-enter the WPA); Koryagin, supra
note 49, at 268, 269 (describing the Soviet concern of readmittance to the WPA).
175. See Ellman, supra note 23, at 82 (stating that the WPA has strongly argued
since the late 1970s that the Soviet Union must reform its abuse of psychiatry).
176. Id. at 85. The Soviet Union resigned from the WPA to avoid facing a possible
expulsion due to WPA investigatory demands. Id.
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requesting reform of such practices. In response to the WPA's pro-
nouncements, Helsinki Watch groups, Amnesty International,
I.A.P.U.P., and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) took ac-
tion to investigate Soviet practices and to provide the WPA with re-
ports on specific cases of Soviet psychiatric abuse. 17 These groups also
publicize information1 7 9 concerning instances of psychiatric abuse and
request that Soviet officials and psychiatrists release dissidents from
psychiatric hospitals.180 In 1983, discouraged due to failure of the So-
viet Union to implement reforms, the WPA discussed possible expul-
sion of the Soviet All-Union Society of Neuropathologists and
Psychiatrists.1 '
Soviet authorities, anticipating expulsion, resigned from the WPA in
1983 several months before the WPA convened.'8 2 In a letter to the
WPA, the Soviet organization expressed its concern over the politicized
nature of the WPA. 1 3 The Soviet All-Union Society of Neuropatholo-
gists and Psychiatrists claims that western countries used the WPA to
antagonize the Soviet Union politically and to discredit Soviet psychia-
177. Id. The WPA established a Committee to Review the Abuse of Psychiatry for
Political Purposes to monitor individual instances of alleged abuse. Id. at 20-21.
178. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 9 (statement of Dr. Charles H. Fair-
banks, Jr.) (reporting on the contribution that Amnesty International made in ob-
taining and publicizing information concerning Soviet psychiatric abuse); Osakwe,
supra note 16, at 287 (explaining that Helsinki Watch groups helped to monitor psy-
chiatric abuses of dissidents); Psychiatric Abuse in USSR, supra note 2, at 3 (asserting
that the IAPUP publicized information concerning the political abuse of psychiatry).
179. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 63-75 (statement of Professor Harvey
Fireside) (indicating that Amnesty International's desire is to publicize information
until the Soviet Union effectively remedies the problem).
180. Id. at 63-75; see supra notes 171-177 and accompanying text (explaining that
international groups disagree with the imprisonment of dissidents). The international
groups monitoring Soviet psychiatric treatment demand reforms and use international
publicity to force the cooperation of the Soviet government. Id.
181. See Koryagin, supra note 49, at 268 (explaining that the Soviet Union faced
possible expulsion from the WPA because of reports of Soviet psychiatric abuse). The
Sixth Congress of the WPA became a forum for the discussion of abusive psychiatric
practices. Id.; 2 Million Quit Soviet Mental-Patient Rolls, supra note 166, at 32 (stat-
ing that Great Britain and the United States wanted the Soviet Union expelled from
the WPA).
182. See Soviet Psychiatrists Leave World Body, supra note 167, at 1-3 (reporting
that claiming abuse in the form of slanderous propaganda from member groups of the
WPA, the Soviet All-Union Scientific Society of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists
resigned from the WPA). The Soviet government asserts that the United States and
Great Britain encourage an anti-Soviet political campaign. Id. In addition, the Soviet
government alleges that member states of the WPA use psychiatry to express political
views. Id.
183. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 49, at 22 (setting forth Soviet complaints of the
political nature of the WPA in a letter to the WPA from the Soviet All-Union Scien-
tific Society of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists).
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try.18 4 The Soviets assert that the WPA should focus on scientific de-
velopments in the field of psychiatry and resist politically motivated
pressures from member state organizations. 185 Soviet authorities claim
that they were willing to comply with requests for information on alleg-
edly abused dissidents.18 6 Despite this claim by Soviet authorities, how-
ever, international organizations continue to report the Soviets' negligi-
ble response to requests for information.'8 7
B. RESULTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO REFORM
PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE
In the midst of international pressure for reform, Soviet authorities
proposed the Statute.' 8 The adoption of this Statute stemmed from
Soviet concern for the international approval of human rights organiza-
tions and foreign governments. a89 The Soviet Union seeks readmittance
to the WPA in 1989;191 in support of readmittance, the Soviets assert
that the Statute will rectify the concerns of the international psychiatry
community.' 9' A decrease in the number of dissidents committed to
psychiatric hospitals, 9 2 a plan to release committed psychiatric pa-
184. Id. at 25-30; see 'Anti-Soviet Chorus' at Psychiatric Meeting, supra note 166,
at 1-3 (explaining the view that western organizations predominantly influence the
WPA). The criticism from the member states of the WPA is politically motivated and
their criticism of Soviet psychiatric practices is simply a tool to further political goals.
Id.
185. Id. The Soviet government asserts that member states of the WPA simply
disagree with Soviet political doctrines and falsely attack psychiatric practices without
scientific proof of Soviet psychiatric abuse. Id.
186. See Ready to Rejoin Association, supra note 87, at 80 (asserting that in
1988, Soviet officials were prepared to permit foreign psychiatrists to visit, but foreign
psychiatrists indicated that they had no interest); Krauthammer, The Verdict on Soviet
Psychiatry, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1989, at 19 (noting that the Soviets finally permitted
nineteen psychiatry experts to visit Soviet psychiatric hospitals in March 1989). The
American experts examined twenty-seven patients. Id.
187. See Amnesty International, Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra
note 17, at 20 (claiming that after presenting numerous requests for information about
individuals, Amnesty International only received two replies from the Soviets in 1983).
188. Psychiatric Assistance Statute, supra note 1, at 11; see Politics and Soviet
Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551 (stating that the effect of the new law depends on
whether there is a change in the leadership of the medical establishment).
189. See Sharansky, supra note 23, at 4 (implying that under Gorbachev, the So-
viet Union wants to encourage favorable western public opinion); Politics and Soviet
Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551 (explaining that the Soviet Union is partly liberaliz-
ing its laws in hopes of being reinstated into the membership in the WPA).
190. Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551-52 (explaining that the
Soviet Union plans to request readmittance to the WPA in 1989).
191. Id. at 551-53 (describing changes in psychiatric law instituted in the Soviet
Union that respond to WPA concerns). Critics express doubt that legislative changes
will have an effect if administrative personnel changes do not occur. Id.
192. See Psychiatric Abuse in USSR, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that Amnesty
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tients,1 93 and a willingness to allow foreign states to examine Soviet
patients are evidence of the Soviet government's desire to obtain inter-
national approval."' There remains concern, however, that even with
the implementation of the Statute, the Soviet Union may refuse to ef-
fectively respond to international criticisms.19 5
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The successful implementation of the Statute depends upon several
factors. First, the government enforcement of domestic legislative re-
forms that are manifested in the appeals law, law governing the bar,
and revised Criminal Code must support individual rights enumerated
in the Statute. The appeals law and changes to the law governing the
bar, if executed, will provide those subjected to psychiatric examination
with legal counsel and judicial review."9 8 Furthermore, proposed
amendments to the Criminal Code must be implemented to assign
criminal liability to officials and professionals who commit healthy indi-
viduals to psychiatric hospitals. 97 Soviet officials' combined acceptance
and enforcement of these domestic laws will provide individuals with
the right to challenge psychiatric diagnoses and to sue unethical offi-
cials or professionals. Consequently, judicial monitoring of official ad-
herence to the Statute will increase.
International reports that the recent release of psychiatric patients is the largest since
the 1960s); see also Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 551 (indicating
that although releases of psychiatric patients occur, a large number of dissidents re-
main unjustly institutionalized).
193. See Ready to Rejoin Association, supra note 87, at 80 (indicating a Soviet
plan to release two million people from psychiatric control); 2 Million to Quit Soviet
Mental-Patient Rolls, supra note 167, at A32 (stating that the Ministry of Health
plans to remove two million from the government's list of mental patients).
194. See Superpowers Seek Accord on Visiting Mental Hospitals, supra note 49,
at 1 (detailing plans in 1988 to allow United States doctors to examine Soviet pa-
tients); Krauthammer, supra note 186, at 19 (describing the visit of a group of Ameri-
can psychiatrists to the Soviet Union). The Americans interviewed Soviet psychiatric
patients or ex-patients. Id. The Soviets allowed this visit in an effort to gain readmit-
tance to the WPA in the fall of 1989. Id. Readmission to the WPA would make it
possible for the Soviet Union to participate in the 1991 Human Rights Conference now
scheduled for Moscow. Id.
195. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (explaining Soviet resistance to
international pressures to reform practices because they do not want to admit past
abusive practices).
196. See supra notes 138, 145 and accompanying text (referring to the appeals law
and the legal guarantees mandated under the Statute).
197. Drafting of New Criminal Code Explained, supra note 136, at 58. Soviet offi-
cials will add a section to the Soviet Criminal Code punishing crimes against "peace
and humanity." Id. The purpose of these amendments to the Criminal Code is to "reli-
ably protect peoples' rights and to guarantee strict observance of legality" in Soviet
society. Id.
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Second, changes must occur within the psychiatric profession itself.
Instructions pertaining to the treatment and commitment of individuals
to psychiatric institutions must change at the local hospital level to
guarantee accurate diagnosis and the right to appeal commitment deci-
sions as stipulated in the 1988 Statute. 8 The appointment of new per-
sons to administrative positions within the Soviet psychiatric organiza-
tional framework must occur to ensure the implementation of reforms
under the Statute. In addition, a reform in the clinical criteria used to
classify patients as mentally ill must emerge at the local level. Further-
more, Soviet psychiatric practice must not involve abusive treatment
through the use of psychotropic drugs.198 Far too often, dissidents are
treated as mentally ill and subjected to the use of psychotropic drugs as
punishment.200 The Soviet definition of schizophrenia facilitates the di-
agnosis of dissidents as mentally ill.201 Future practices must conform
to the humanitarian goals expressed in the Statute.
Third, Soviet officials must attempt to separate political concerns
from individual psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. The close relation-
ship between psychiatric officials, professionals, and the Soviet govern-
ment facilitates government use of psychiatry to oppress political dissi-
dents.20 2 Those officials who are committed to the objective of the
Statute should encourage judicial intervention to monitor the legality of
psychiatric practices.20 3
Finally, readmittance of the Soviet Union to the WPA must be en-
couraged under conditions stressing the necessity of further Soviet
198. See IAPUP Information Bulletin No. 18, supra note 49, at 4 (indicating that
instructions are published after the issuance of the Statute for the purpose of imple-
menting the Statute).
199. Health Aide Cited on Psychiatric Reforms, supra note 96, at 10-11 (explain-
ing that Soviet psychiatry was once based on the use of psychotropic drugs; however,
the use of psychotherapeutic treatment has experienced a renaissance in the past few
years).
200. See Ellman, supra note 23, at 84 (describing the administration of psycho-
tropic drugs to a person with "sluggish schizophrenia" noting that Soviet doctors in-
creased the dosage when the patient complained about an illness); Politics and Soviet
Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (describing the brutilization of patients in psychiatric
hospitals and the torurous use of anti-psychotic drugs); Grigoriants, supra note 64, at
A31 (documenting the forced treatment of "healthy" patients with magnesium sulfate
injections to control them, causing agonizing pain).
201. See Politics and Soviet Psychiatry, supra note 18, at 552 (explaining that
Soviet definitions of schizophrenia make it easy for organizations such as the KGB to
commit people to psychiatric hospitals).
202. See supra notes 24, 25, 32-34, 49-58 & 68-72 and accompanying text
(describing the Soviet government structure, the treatment of dissidents, and the psy-
chiatric professions' participation in the process).




human rights reforms. This will permit the WPA to play a more active
role in influencing the implementation of the Soviet Statute.2"' The
monitoring of the Statute and other Soviet reforms by international or-
ganizations and foreign states will help to bind the Soviet government
to its legislative mandates.
CONCLUSION
The guarantees of legal representation, protection of individual
rights, and professional accountability, stated in the Statute, can re-
form psychiatric abuse and procedural deficiencies."" The reality of the
political situation in the Soviet Union, however, suggests that reforms
of the psychiatric system may not last.20 6 The historical heritage of so-
cialism, stressing the superiority of a hierarchical one party system,
conflicts with legislation supporting individual rights.207 Failures to ad-
here to the Constitution, the Helsinki Final Act, and the 1971 Direc-
tive demonstrated that state party practices supercede Soviet promises
to recognize individual rights when conflicts of law or goals arise.2 3
International human rights concerns and the publicity of Soviet psychi-
atric abuse when combined with Gorbachev's glasnost reforms will lead
to short term changes in psychiatric practices and procedural guaran-
tees. Whether the Statute remains effective beyond this period of inter-
national publicity and Soviet reform is uncertain.
204. See supra notes 173-186 and accompanying text (describing the WPA's influ-
ence on Soviet psychiatric commitment practices).
205. See supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text (describing the Psychiatric
Assistance Statute and its goal to reform past practices).
206. See Health Aide Cited on Psychiatric Reforms, supra note 96, at 10-11
(claiming that the readmittance of the Soviet Union to the WPA before the effects of
the new Statute are measured "will amount to absolution and acceptance of their deni-
als with regard to questions of psychiatric abuse"); Gumbel, supra note 109, at A6
(asserting that as long as Dr. Vartanyan remains Chief Psychiatrist, the Soviets resis-
tance to reform of past psychiatric practices is doubtful).
207. See Bloed, supra note 167, at 83 (stating that under the socialist system,
guaranteeing individual rights against unlawful government interference can not exist;
this only exists in capitalist societies).
208. See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987,
supra note 28, at 1063 (describing the superiority of top political officials in all political
and social matters); Dean, supra note 24, at 64-65 (arguing that Soviet political offi-
cials are the source of individual rights for Soviet citizens); Feldbrugge, supra note 38,
at 463 (declaring that the Soviet Constitution does not provide legal protections for
Soviet citizens; political officials must legislate these rights); Amnesty International,
Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR, supra note 17, at 4 (explaining that Soviet
officials often violate the mandates of the 1971 Directive). The Soviets failed to comply
with the mandates of the Helsinki Final Act. Id. at 20.
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